Hofstra Law Review
Volume 27 | Issue 4

Article 5

1999

A Scout is Morally Straight, Brave, Clean,
Trustworthy...and Heterosexual? Gays in the Boy
Scouts of America
Marissa L. Goodman

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Goodman, Marissa L. (1999) "A Scout is Morally Straight, Brave, Clean, Trustworthy...and Heterosexual? Gays in the Boy Scouts of
America," Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 27: Iss. 4, Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol27/iss4/5

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Goodman: A Scout is Morally Straight, Brave, Clean, Trustworthy...and Hete

NOTE
A SCOUT IS MORALLY STRAIGHT, BRAVE,
CLEAN, TRUSTWORTHY... AND
HETEROSEXUAL? GAYS IN THE BOY SCOUTS OF
AMERICA
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .........................................................................

826

If. PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION STATUTES .....................................

828

I.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION ......................................................

833

A. Roberts v. United States Jaycees ......................................

836

1. Freedom of Intimate Association ..................................
2. Freedom of Expressive Association .............................
B. Board of Directors of Rotary v. International Club
of D uarte ...........................................................................
C. New York State Club Association v.
City of New York ..............................................................
D. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group .................................................................

838
839

IV. HOMOSEXUALS AND THE BOY SCouTs OF AMERICA ..............
A. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America ........................................
B. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the
Boy Scouts of America .....................................................
C. Richardson v. Chicago Area Council of the
Boy Scouts of America .....................................................

842
845
847
849
856
862
868

V. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE

BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA .......................................................

A.

Freedom of Intimate Association and the
Boy Scouts of America ......................................................

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1999

875

876

1

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [1999], Art. 5

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:825

B. Freedom of Expressive Association and the
Boy Scouts ofAmerica ......................................................
VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................

880
884

POSTSCRI .......................................................
885
Dale v. Boy Scouts of America Revisited......................... 886
Richardson v. Chicago Area Council of the
Boy Scouts of America Revisited ..................................... 889
I.

INTRODUCTION

"On my honor I will do my best
To do my duty to God and my country
and to obey the Scout Law;
To help other people at all times;
To keep myself physically strong,
mentally awake, and morally straight."'
The federal and state governments' crusades against invidious discrimination are fought with a variety of statutory weapons. Included in
this arsenal are state public accommodation laws which require groups
that serve the public to do so equally, thus allowing individuals to use,
without discrimination, the services offered by such groups.2 Since public accommodation statutes have been applied to a wide spectrum of
groups ranging from privately owned restaurants to little league baseball
teams,3 these laws have the potential of intruding into a group's practices and forcing the alteration of a group's membership criteria and
policies.
The groups faced with the application of a public accommodation
law do not greet this state intrusion with open arms. These groups reach
into their arsenal of legal weaponry and counter with the constitutional
1. ROBERT C. BIRKBy, THE BoY Scour HANDBOOK 549 (10th ed. 1990).
2. See Sally Frank, The Key to Unlocking the Clubhouse Door: The Application of AntidiscriminationLaws to Quasi-PrivateClubs, 2 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 27, 40-41 (1994); Paul Varela,
Note, A Scout Is Friendly: Freedom of Association and the State Effort to End Private Discrimination, 30 WM. & MARYL. REV. 919, 919 (1989).

3. See, e.g., National Org. for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 318 A.2d 33, 37-38
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974) ("[P]ublic accommodations are commonly provided at fixed
'places,' e.g., hotels, restaurants, swimming pools .... Little League is a public accommodation
because the invitation is open to children in the community at large, with no restriction (other than
sex) whatever.").
4. See Varela, supra note 2, at 919.
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defense of the right to freedom of association.5 This weapon is a powerful one in that a court's affirmative application of the right will render

the group constitutionally privileged to use discriminatory criteria, such
as gender, race, and sexual orientation, in selecting its members. One

group, in its zealous fight for this constitutional privilege and in response to litigation involving the public accommodation laws of various

states, has repeatedly alleged that the forced inclusion of certain groups
violates its members' right to freedom of association. This group is
none other than the Boy Scouts of America ("BSA").

The BSA, an international hallmark of youth and scouting, has
been involved in almost constant litigation concerning what the BSA

refers to as the "'[t]hree G' membership policy-[the] ban[] [on] gays,
godless[ness] and girls."7 The BSA maintains that, by virtue of the pri-

vate nature of its organization and of the beliefs it tries to instill, it has
the "right" to exclude women, atheists, agnostics, and publicly avowed
homosexuals. 8 While federal and state courts have held that the BSA
5. See, e.g., Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1987)
(deciding that the members' right of association does not outweigh the state's compelling interest
in eliminating discrimination against women); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618
(1984) (hearing argument from the Jaycees that state interference with a person's choice of whom
they join with in a common endeavor implicates the freedom of association); Curran v. Mount
Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 219 (Cal. 1998) (determining whether the
California public accommodation statute may infringe upon the Boy Scouts of America's ("BSA")
right of association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
6. See Curran,952 P.2d at 219.
7. David Whitman, Beyond Thrift andLoyalty, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 14, 1991,
at 50.
8. See, e.g., Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1268 (7th Cir. 1993) (arguing
that the plaintiff was denied membership because he refused to affirm his belief in God); Curran,
952 P.2d at 219 (explaining that the BSA rejected a homosexual's application to be an adult
leader); Randall v. Orange County Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 261, 262 (Cal. 1998)
(refusing to allow the plaintiffs to continue as Boy Scouts if they did not participate in the religion-related elements of the program); Yeaw v. Boy Scouts of Am., 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 85, 85 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1997) (arguing that the BSA is not under the purview of the California civil rights statute,
and thus may exclude females), review granted and opinion superseded by 942 P.2d 415 (Cal.
1997), and review dismissed, cause remanded by 960 P.2d 509 (Cal. 1998); Quinnipiac Council,
Boy Scouts of Am., Inc. v. Comm'n on Human Rights and Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352, 356
(Conn. 1987) (denying the plaintiff the opportunity to serve as a Scoutmaster because of her gender); Seabourn v. Coronado Area Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 891 P.2d 385, 395 (Kan. 1995)
(excluding the plaintiff from an adult leadership position because of his unwillingness to profess a
belief in, and duty to, a supreme being); Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270, 276 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. App. Div. 1998), aff'd, No. A-195/196-97, 1999 N.J. LEXIS 995, at *1 (Aug. 4, 1999)
(arguing that homosexuals may not register as adult leaders); Richardson v. Chicago Area Council
of the Boy Scouts of Am., No. 92-E-80, 1996 WL 734724, at *1 (Chi. Comm'n Hum. Rel. Feb.
21, 1996), aff'd, No. 96 CH 03266, at 1 (I1. Cir. Ct. Cook County Aug. 12, 1999) (unpublished
opinion) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review) (prohibiting the employment of avowed homosexuals).
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may exclude women, 9 atheists, and agnostics,'1 the courts are split as to

whether the forced inclusion of gays would violate the BSA's right to
freedom of association."
Some of this inconsistency can be attributed to the fact that each
state has its own public accommodation law with unique statutory language. However, placing these statutory schemes aside, the courts have
still reached opposite conclusions regarding the BSA's alleged constitutional right to freedom of association. The judicial disparity on this
constitutional issue paves the road for arguments before the United
States Supreme Court.
This Note examines the BSA's argument that it is entitled to discriminate against homosexuals in its membership policies on the constitutional ground of freedom of association. For purposes of analysis, this
Note assumes that the BSA is a public accommodation. 2 This assumption is imperative because if the BSA is not a public accommodation,
but rather a private organization, it may employ discriminatory membership criteria and the constitutional defense of freedom of association
is inapplicable.
Part II of this Note briefly reviews the various types of public accommodation laws, emphasizing the laws of New Jersey and California
since the courts in these states have specifically ruled on this issue. Part
I explores the doctrine of freedom of association, setting forth the present Supreme Court cases on the subject. Part IV analyzes the recent
cases involving homosexuals and the BSA. Finally, in Part V, this Note
applies the Supreme Court's test for freedom of association to the BSA,
and concludes that its members' right to freedom of association will not
be impinged upon by the forced inclusion of gays.
I1. PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION STATUTES
At the end of the Civil War, Congress enacted the first federal
public accommodation statute with the goal of eliminating discrimination in privately owned institutions that are open to the public.'3 In 1883,

9. See Yeaw, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 85-86.
10. See Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1278; Randall, 952 P.2d at 266; Seabourn, 891 P.2d at 406.
11. See infra PartIV.

12. This is a valid assumption. See Dale, 706 A.2d at 274 (holding that the BSA is a public
accommodation). But see Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1278 (holding that the BSA is not a public accommodation under Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Seabourn, 891 P.2d at 406 (holding that
the BSA is not a public accommodation under the Kansas public accommodation law).
13. See Frank, supra note 2, at 40-41; Pamela Griffin, Exclusion and Access in Public Accommodations: FirstAmendment Limitationsupon State Law, 16 PAC. L.J. 1047, 1050-51 (1985);
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during the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court found this piece of
legislation unconstitutional.1 4 The states, exercising their legitimate police power,"s responded to the judicially created void by enacting their
own public accommodation laws.' 6 Eighty years later, during the civil
rights movement of the 1960s, Congress enacted another public accommodation law, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' 7 Title II
provides in part: "All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in
this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of
race, color, religion, or national origin."'" Over the years, state public
accommodation laws, rather than federal public accommodation laws,
have been the more effective tool in combating discrimination.' 9
The scope of state public accommodation statutes generally exceeds the scope of Title II in relation to both the classes of individuals
they protect, and the types of organizations they govern." While they
vary from one state to the next, state public accommodation statutes
prohibit not only discrimination based on race, creed, color, national
origin, ancestry, and religion, but also discrimination on the basis of
age, disability, sex, affectional or sexual orientation, personal appearance, marital status, and familial status.2' The tricky aspect of state public accommodation laws is not necessarily the question of who is afforded protection, but rather the determination of what types of
organizations fall within their regulatory ambit.

Varela, supranote 2, at 932.

14. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
15. See Griffin, supra note 13, at 1053.
16. See infra note 21.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994).
18. Id.
19. See Griffin, supranote 13, at 1050; Varela, supra note 2, at 932.
20. See Erika Marie Brown & Stephanie Greene, From Private Clubs to Parades:How Accommodating Are State Laws?, 42 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 125, 125 (1998).
21. See, e.g., CAL.CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1982 & Supp. 1999) (enumerating sex, race, color,

religion, ancestry, national origin, or disability); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 46a-64 (West 1995)
(including race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status, age, lawful source of
income, mental retardation, and mental or physical disability); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2501 (1992)
(listing race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual
orientation, family responsibilities, matriculation, political affiliation, disability, source of income,
and place of residence or business); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1993) (providing for race,
creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, affectional or sexual orientation, or sex);
N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296(2)(a) (McKinney 1998) (enumerating race, creed, color, national origin,
sex, disability, or marital status); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-2 (1994) (including race or color, religion, country of national origin, handicap, age, and sex).
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The breadth of state public accommodation laws varies depending

upon legislative definitions and judicial interpretations of what constitutes a public accommodation. Since Supreme Court limitations on the
definition of "public accommodation" have largely been based on

statutory construction rather than constitutional interpretation, 2 states
are essentially free to define "public accommodation" as they see fit.O

As such, some states define "public accommodation" in terms of general public access,24 while others focus on the type of business dealings

an organization conducts.' Other state definitions of "public accommodation" depend on whether an organization consistently meets at a fixed

location.2 Still other state statutes appear to cover all organizations not
protected by the constitutional right to intimate or expressive association.27
Although states do not have to exempt certain organizations from
their statutes, some do so on the grounds that such institutions are
"private" or "distinctly private."' To avoid every organization from
claiming they are "private," states should define these terms with a great
deal of specificity. Yet, regardless if the exemption is precisely defined,
the trend
in many state courts has been to interpret the exemption nar29
rowly.
The construction and interpretation of state public accommodation

statutes is explained by one commentator as a judicial activity subject to
three variables.' First, the judiciary will rely on the legislative intent of
the statute in determining its application.3 However, this may not al22. See Griffin, supra note 13, at 1053.
23. See Varela, supranote 2, at 934.
24. See Frank,supra note 2, at 41 (citing 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 954 (West 1991)).
25. See id. (citing both CAL. Ctv. CODE § 51 (West 1982) and MINN STAT. ANN. § 363.01
(West 1991)).
26. See id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300(14) (Michie 1992); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2502
(1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.2 (West 1990); and MASS. ANN. LAvS ch. 272, § 92A (Law.
Co-op. 1992)).
27. See id.(citing N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 10:5-5 (West 1993)). For a discussion of various states'
judicial interpretations of their respective public accommodation laws, see Brown & Greene, supra
note 20; John E. Theuman, Annotation, Exclusion or Expulsionfrom Association or Club as Violation of State Civil Rights Act, 38 A.L.R. 4th 628 (1985).
28. See, e.g., ARmZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1441(2) (West1992) (excluding all places which
are distinctly private in nature from the definition of public accommodation); D.C. CODE ANN, §
1-2502(24) (1981) (enumerating factors which must be considered when determining whether an
organization is "distinctly private"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(0) (West 1993) (exempting distinctly private places from the definition of public accommodation); N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 292(9)
(McKinney 1993) (exempting specific types of institutions).
29. See Frank, supra note 2, at 50.
30. See Varela, supra note 2, at 934-35.
31. Seeid. at934.
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ways be a viable option since legislatures do not always include a section stating the purpose and/or the goals of the statute they are enacting. 2 The second variable is the effects of interpreting a compound state
anti-discrimination law.33 Since compound statutes are all-inclusive,
prohibiting discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations, judges may impose a "'sliding scale of importance"' on different violations regardless of the legislative intent.' Judges in states
with compound public accommodation statutes will be less likely to
find a violation of the public accommodation portion of the statute, than
judges in states with separate public accommodation laws.35 The third
and final variable in constructing and interpreting state public accommodation statutes is the existence of statutory language defining the
terms of the statute.36 A statute can provide an express list of definitions
relieving the judiciary from interpreting these terms, 37 however the
commentator suggests that some judges may still choose to interpret the
statutory language using their own methodology of construction.38
A state public accommodation law that specifically lists the types
of organizations that constitute a "place of public accommodation"
leaves little ambiguity, thus making it relatively simple for the court to
apply. The disadvantage of such a precise definition is that it leaves the
courts with little latitude to interpret the statute so as to effectuate its
purpose and eliminate discrimination. On the other hand, an extremely
general definition requires judicial interpretation and construction, and
although it is more difficult to apply, it provides the judiciary with
plenty of leeway. Given the polarity of these choices, perhaps the more
suitable public accommodation law is one that defines "place of public

32. See id. at 935 (stating that "some [statutes] begin with a legislative statement of purpose,
making the judiciary's job relatively simple; other [statutes] are silent as to intended scope and
purpose, relying on case law to fill in the blanks").
33. See id.
34. Id. (quoting Note, Public Accommodation Statutes: Is Ladies' Night Out?, 37 MERCER
L. REV. 1605, 1618 (1986)).
35. See id. (asserting that this result occurs because "'[t]he importance of a male not being
able to buy a drink, attend a basketball game, or get his car washed for the same price as a female
pales in comparison to someone not being able to obtain housing or employment because of his or
her race or sex"') (quoting Note, Public Accommodation Statutes: Is Ladies' Night Out?, 37
MERCERL. REv. 1605, 1618 (1986)).
36. See id.
37. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5 (West 1993) (providing definitions of the terms used

in the statute).
38.

See Varela, supra note 2, at 935.
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accommodation" broadly and includes a nonexclusive list of the types
of institutions that fall within this definition.39
California's public accommodation law, the Unruh Civil Rights
Act ("UCRA"), 40 is an example of an extremely general statute. It provides in relevant part: "All persons within the jurisdiction of this state
are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion,
ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the ful and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.' ' 1 The California legislature did
not include a list of items illustrating the types of organizations that are
"business establishments" under the UCRA. The absence of a qualifying
list, coupled with the law's broad scope, leaves the judiciary with a
great deal of leeway to interpret and apply the statutory terms.
An example of a "middle of the road" statute that defines "public
accommodation" broadly and includes a nonexclusive list is the New
Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("LAD"). 42 It reads:
All persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment,
and to obtain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities,
and privileges of any place of public accommodation, publicly
assisted housing accommodation, and other real property without discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin,
ancestry, age, marital status, affectional or sexual orientation or
sex, subject only to conditions and limitations applicable alike
to all persons. This opportunity is recognized as and declared to
be a civil right.
The LAD is a compound statute and arguably susceptible to the
"sliding scale of importance." The legislature provided some guidance
as to how it intended the statute to be applied by including a section
stating its findings and declarations," as well as a section dedicated to
defining the LAD's terms. 45 Within this latter section is a nonexclusive
list of the types of institutions the legislature intended the LAD to govern. Thus, the New Jersey legislature guided the judiciary on how and

39. For example, the New Jersey statute states: "'A place of public accommodation' shall
include, but is not limited to: .... "N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-50) (West 1993).
40. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (west 1982 & Supp. 1999).
41. Id.
42. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to -42 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998).

43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. § 10:5-4.
See id. § 10:5-3.
See id. § 10:5-5.
See id. § 10:5-50).
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to whom it intended the LAD to apply, at the same time leaving the judiciary enough latitude to accomplish the legislature's goal of eradicating discrimination.
The states' exercise of their reserved police power via the enactment of state public accommodation laws47 illustrates their recognition
that discrimination takes many forms and hides behind many doors. For
example, New Jersey justifies the potential intrusive nature of these
laws by reiterating the ultimate goal of eradicating invidious discrimination.48 This justification is sometimes not enough. While the states
have the best intentions, their police power is not absolute.49 In many
situations it must be weighed against an organization's or group's right
to freedom of association.
I1. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

Humans have an essential and fundamental need for a sense of
community. 0 An individual's family used to fulfill this need, but with
each new generation, people have been moving further away from their
extended families into ethnically diverse neighborhoods and, as a result,
have lost that feeling of community."' In an effort to reestablish that lost
sense of community, people form or join organizations and groups, both
public and private, which are composed of individuals with similar beliefs and ideals.52 While the need for community is once again fulfilled,
the common, often unfortunate, result is the exclusion of individuals
who are different, regardless of how minor the differences may be.
Americans, the constituents of the "melting pot," are prime examples of
this association process. 3 As Alexis de Tocqueville stated: "In no country in the world has the principle of association been more successfully
used, or applied to a greater multitude of objects, than in America."' 4
47.

See Griffin, supra note 13, at 1053.

48. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998).
49. See Griffin, supra note 13, at 1053.

50. See Frank,supra note 2, at 31.
51. See id. at 32.
52. See id.; Andrew M. Perlman, Public Accommodation Laws and the DualNature of the
Freedom of Association, 8 GEO. MASON U. CIv. RTs. L.J. 111, 114 (1998).

53. Andrew M. Perlman refers to this process as the "dual nature of the freedom of association." Perlman, supra note 52, at 113. Perlman argues that while the freedom of association permits and fosters exclusionary practices (a negative interest), it also "provides a basis for individuals to gain access to certain group activity (a positive interest)." Id. The negative interest in
association is premised on inequality and discrimination, and the positive interest is based on the
need to associate. See id. at 115. Perlman argues that the positive interest in association "provides
a basis for trumping the negative right to association." Id.
54. ALEXIS DETOCQuEVILLE, DEMOCRACY INAMERICA 191 (Richard D. Heffner ed., 1956).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1999

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [1999], Art. 5

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:825

What de Tocqueville failed to note was that along with America's successful application of the idea of association comes America's battle
against inequality and discrimination.
The United States has been battling inequality and discrimination
since its birth. Although the United States Constitution does not directly
prohibit discrimination by individuals that are not state actors,55 some
state legislatures, in recognition that discrimination harms not only its
victims but society as well, have passed laws prohibiting discriminatory
conduct.5 6 Despite the legislatures' efforts to eliminate it, discrimination
continues to cause individuals to suffer the indignities of exclusion and
inequality "because inherent in the message of discrimination is the
message that the excluded person is not good enough to be part of the
' This message is often internalized by the people exposed to it,
group. 57
the negative stereotypes and hatred are then reinforced, and thus the vicious cycle continues. s A state's goal of promoting equality and eradicating discrimination comes into direct conflict with the individual's
need to maintain a sense of community and to associate with other
similar individuals. This fundamental conflict exists at the core of the
freedom of association argument.
Freedom of association is an issue fraught with tension and conflict. "The most obvious conflict raised, for example, involves the two
virtual first principles of contemporary constitutional law: freedom and
equality. The right to choose one's associates (freedom) is pitted against
the right to equal treatment (equality), a most fundamental conflict."59
The conflict between associational freedom and equality can be viewed
as one facet of the larger tension between "egalitarian, rights-oriented
' The egalitarian, rights-oriented apliberalism and communitarianism. 'W
proach seeks a neutral legal system that can assure each person the opportunity to pursue his individual beliefs, interests, and goals. 6' Since a
person's worth is determined by the choices he makes, the egalitarian
views anti-discrimination laws, the means to expand individual rights,

55. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172-73 (1972); William P. Marshall,
Discriminationandthe Right ofAssociation, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 68, 68 (1986).
56. See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998) (declaring that discrimination threatens not only New Jersey residents, but also "the institutions and foundation of a free
democratic State").
57. Frank, supra note 2, at 36-37.

58. See id.
59. Marshall, supra note 55, at 69.
60. Douglas 0. Linder, Comment, Freedom of Association After Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 82 MICH. L. Rnv. 1878, 1881 (1984).

61. See id.
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"as unqualified moral and political progress."6 2 On the opposite end of
the spectrum, the communitarian believes that a person's identity is not
derived from his choices, but rather from the communities in which he
is involved.63 Anything that intrudes and erodes the community, including anti-discrimination laws, "concentrates power in the state, and...
reduces the vitality and diversity of public life."' According to egali6
tarians, the communitarian approach is an "invitation to prejudice."
Regardless of how the opposing sides of the conflict are described,
selecting one side may unfairly deprive an arbitrarily excluded group
from obtaining goods and services, while choosing the other side may
impinge upon the excluding group's First Amendment rights. 6 Although compromising a group's right of association is risky, the crusade
against invidious discrimination is a primary objective on judicial and
legislative agendas. 67 This serious and fundamental dilemma requires
the delicate balancing of the competing interests. Throughout the years,
the Supreme Court has dealt with these issues peripherally. 6' In 1984,
62. Id. at 1881-82.
63. See id. at 1882.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Varela, supra note 2, at 926.
67. See Marshall, supranote 55, at 70.
68. In 1958, the Court recognized an implied right to freedom of association. See NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-63 (1958). The Court held that a state court order
requiring the NAACP to disclose the names of its members violated the group's right to freedom
of association. See id. at 462. "Itis beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech." Id. at 460.
In 1966, the Court, faced with racial inequality and an alleged violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, recognized the countervailing principles of freedom of association and equality. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 298 (1966). Justice Douglas, delivering the majority
opinion, wrote:
[One principle is] the right of the individual to pick his own associates so as to express
his preferences and dislikes, and to fashion his private life by joining such clubs and
groups as he chooses. The other [principle] is the constitutional ban in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against state-sponsored racial inequality
....A private golf club, however, restricted to either Negro or white membership is
one expression of freedom of association.
Id. at 298-99. Justice Douglas reaffirmed this proposition in a later dissenting opinion in which he
wrote:
The associational rights which our system honors permit all white, all black, all brown,
and all yellow clubs to be formed. They also permit allCatholic, all Jewish, or all agnostic clubs to be established. Government may not tell a man or woman who his or her
associates must be.
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-80 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice
Douglas apparently believed that discrimination in private associations (as opposed to discrimination by state actors) overrides equality. This perspective was later rejected by the Supreme Court.
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the Court decided the landmark case of Roberts v. United States Jaycees,6 9 and set forth the test that enables it to strike the requisite balance
and resolve the conflict.70 Thereafter, the Supreme Court applied the
Jaycees test to a handful of cases, some of which will be discussed in
detail below.
A.

Roberts v. United States Jaycees

In 1974 and 1975, respectively, the Minneapolis and St. Paul
chapters of the United States Jaycees ("Jaycees") began admitting
women as regular members in violation of the organization's by-laws,
which limited regular membership to males between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five.71 In 1978, the president of the national Jaycees informed the two chapters that a motion to revoke their charters would be
considered by the National Board of Directors.72 Immediately thereafter,
both chapters filed charges of sex discrimination with the Minnesota
Department of Human Rights alleging that the exclusion of women
from regular3 membership violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act

(",MHRA").

The Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Rights
conducted an investigation and found probable cause that the national
Jaycees' sanctioning of the two local chapters violated the MHRA.7 Before a hearing was held, the national Jaycees filed suit against various
state officials in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to enjoin
enforcement of the MHRA.75 The national Jaycees alleged that requiring
the organization to include women as regular members violated the
male members' rights to freedom of speech and association. 76 The district court dismissed the suit without prejudice stating that the suit could
be renewed if the administrative hearing resulted in a finding adverse to

See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-24 (1984).

69. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
70. See id. at617-24.
71. See id. at 613-14.
72. See id. at 614.

73. See id. In 1982, the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA") stated: "It is an unfair discriminatory practice: To deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation because
of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin or sex." MINN. STAT. § 363.03(3) (1982).
74. See Jaycees,468 U.S. at 615.
75. See id.
76. See id.
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the Jaycees." The hearing before the Minnesota Human Rights Department proceeded and the examiner concluded that the Jaycees is a place
of public accommodation within the MIHRA, and the exclusion of
women from regular membership was an unfair discriminatory practice.78 The Jaycees were ordered to refrain from discriminating against
any member or applicant on the basis of sex, and from imposing any
sanction on local chapters for admitting women as regular members.79
The Jaycees renewed its suit in federal district court which certified
to the Minnesota Supreme Court the question of whether the Jaycees
should be considered a place of public accommodation under the
MHRA.&0 The Minnesota Supreme Court answered the question in the
affirmative, and the district court held for the state officials.8' A divided
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that decision." The Court of
Appeals held that the application of the MHRA to the Jaycees would be
a "'direct and substantial' interference"83 with the organization's right to
select its members, and the state's interest in eliminating discrimination
was not "sufficiently compelling" to outweigh
8 the interference with the
organization's protected constitutional rights. 4
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's decision, 5 articulating a balancing test to determine whether a state's anti-discrimination
laws violate an organization's right to freedom of association. 6 Ultimately, the Court held that the application of the MHRA to the Jaycees
did not violate the Jaycees' constitutional rights."
The Court noted that there are two aspects to the right of freedom
of association which are derived from two different constitutional
sources." The first aspect, referred to as intimate association, is derived
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See id.
See id. at 615-16.
See id. at616.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 617 (quoting United States Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1572 (8th Cir.

1983)).
84. See id.
85. The appeal was considered by only seven Justices of the Court. See Linder, supra note
60, at 1880. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun disqualified themselves because Burger
was chapter president of the St. Paul Jaycees in 1935 and Blackmun was a former member of the
Minneapolis Jaycees. See id.
86. See Jaycees,468 U.S. at 617-29.

87. See id at 630-31. Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion for the Court. See id.
at
612. Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion. See id.at 631-40. Justice Rehnquist concurred
in the judgment. See id.at 631.
88. See id.at 617-18; Linder, supranote 60, at 1884; Marshall, supra note 55,at 72.
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from the Bill of Rights' preservation of certain highly personal and intimate relationships, 9 and is afforded constitutional protection as a
"fundamental element of personal liberty."" The second type of associational freedom, expressive association, arises out of an individual's
implicit First Amendment right to engage in expressive activities. 9' The
Court stated that the Constitution guarantees freedom of expressive association "as an indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties" such as freedom of speech and assembly.9 A successful argument under either associational freedom may suffice to insulate the
group from a state's anti-discrimination laws; 93 however, the Court
noted that in some instances both forms may be implicated.9
1. Freedom of Intimate Association
The right to freedom of intimate association protects certain
groups' right to privacy. 95 It is based on the recognition that people derive much of their "emotional enrichment" from their close relationships with others and that these relationships help define one's identity,
which is "central to any concept of liberty."96 Since they enhance shared
beliefs and ideas, as well as foster diversity, such personal bonds deserve a certain level of sanctuary from unwarranted state intrusion.97
The Court noted that relationships protected by the freedom of intimate association are similar in nature to those concerning the family:
marriage; childbirth; education and raising of children; and cohabitation
with relatives.98 Because they involve "deep attachments," a high degree
of commitment, and the sharing of "distinctly personal aspects of one's
life," these types of relationships are extremely selective. 9 Therefore,
the right to exclude others is an essential characteristic of these relationships."' While familial relationships exemplify the groups that are pro-

89. See Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 617-18.
90. Id. at 618. For an in-depth examination of the freedom of intimate association, see Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of IntimateAssociation, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980).
91. See Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 618; Linder, supranote 60, at 1884.
92. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 618.
93. See id. ("We therefore find it useful to consider separately the effect of applying the
Minnesota statute to the Jaycees on what could be called its members' freedom of intimate association and their freedom of expressive association.").
94. See id.
95. See Varela, supra note 2, at 927.

96. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 619.
97. See id. at 618-19.

98. See id. at 619.
99. See id. at 619-20.
100. See id. at 620.
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tected by the freedom of intimate association, the Court recognized that
other groups may be protected as well.10'
Determining the limits of the protection of the freedom of association requires "a careful assessment of where that relationship's objective
characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to the
most attenuated of personal attachments."'2 Factors that should be examined in making this determination include "size, purpose, policies,
selectivity, congeniality, and other characteristics that in a particular
case may be pertinent."'0 3
The Jaycees did not qualify as a group entitled to insulation from
the MHRA pursuant to the freedom of intimate association. 4 The Court
emphasized that the local chapters of the Jaycees were large and did not
employ selective criteria for judging new applicants for membership. 5
The memberships of the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters were approximately 400 each and, putting aside age and sex, neither the national nor the local chapters inquired into a new applicant's background.' 6 Membership was limited to males between the ages of
eighteen and thirty-five,'0 7 but the Court noted that women affiliated
with the Jaycees attended meetings and participated in certain seminars
and social functions.' 3 These facts led the Court to conclude that the
Jaycees did not possess the personal characteristics that would trigger
the protection of the freedom of intimate association.' 9 Eliminating the
first issue, the Court then moved on to the examination of the Jaycees'
purported right to freedom of expressive association.
2. Freedom of Expressive Association
The right to expressive association is characterized as an implicit
First Amendment right that is imperative in the protection of the enumerated individual freedoms granted by the First Amendment."0 The
Court stated that the "freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the
government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to en101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See id.
Id.
Id. at 620.
See id. at621.
See id.
See id.
See id. at613.
See id. at 621.
See id.
See id. at 622.
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gage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed.""' It
further emphasized that the protection of collective expression is important in maintaining political, social, and cultural diversity, as well as in
preserving minority expression from majority suppression."' Thus,
implicit in an individual's First Amendment freedoms is the corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of cultural, political, religious, social, economic, and educational ends." 3
The Court, cognizant that unconstitutional government infringement upon expressive association can take numerous forms, was particularly concerned with a state's interference with a group's internal
disposition. 14 'There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the
internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that
forces the group to accept members it does not desire.""' Such an intrusion may consequently hinder the original member's ability to express
those views that initially brought them togetherY.6 "Freedom of association therefore plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.".... To
protect this interest, while ensuring a tie between the asserted right and
an expressive activity, the Court concluded that a group's right to freedom of expressive association would be impinged if the group's
"message or purpose was diluted or altered by the forced inclusion of
another group."' 8 Essentially, there must be a nexus between the organization's exclusionary policy and its expressive practices. This conclusion, however, did not complete the Court's inquiry into this constitutional right. The Court's balancing test remained to be satisfied.
The Court's balancing test involves weighing the infringement
upon a group's right to freedom of expressive association against the
state's compelling interest in eradicating and preventing discrimination.' 9 The test is predicated upon the Court's conclusion that a group's
right to freedom of expressive association is not absolute.2
"Infringements on that right may be justified by regulations adopted to
serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas,
that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of
111. Id.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 622-23.
Id.at 623.
Seeid.
Id.
Varela, supra note 2, at 928; see Jaycees,468 U.S. at 626-28.
See Jaycees,468 U.S. at 623.
See id.
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associational freedoms..'.' The Court, while recognizing that the deprivation of individual dignity and the denial of equal opportunities are
harmful effects of discrimination,'2 noted that state public accommodation statutes, with their goal of eliminating discrimination, "plainly
' If the statute
serve[] compelling state interests of the highest order."'2
"'responds precisely to the substantive problem which legitimately concerns' the State and abridges no more speech or associational freedom
than is necessary to accomplish that purpose," its application
24 will be the
least restrictive means of effectuating the state's interests.
Although the Jaycees members' right to freedom of expressive association was implicated due to their numerous protected activities,'21
they were ultimately unable to convince the Court to afford them constitutional protection.'2 The Jaycees failed to prove that the forced inclusion of women would impede, alter, or dilute its members' ability to engage in expressive activities or the organization's ability "to
disseminate its preferred views." 27 The Court subsequently held that the
Jaycees' associational message and purpose were only tenuously connected to gender exclusivity,'2 and that the application of the MHRA to
the Jaycees did not "impose[] any serious burdens on the male members' freedom of expressive association."' 9 The Court concluded its
analysis by applying the balancing test."' It stated that even if there
were an "incidental abridgment"13' of the Jaycees' rights, this infringement would not outweigh Minnesota's legitimate interest in eradicating
discrimination.3 2 Moreover, the Court held that the MHRA was33 the least
restrictive means available to the state to accomplish its goals.

121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
See id. at 625.
Id. at 624.
Id. at 629 (quoting City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,

810 (1984)).
125. See id. at 622. The Court noted: "Over the years, the national and local levels of the organization have taken public positions on a number of diverse issues, and members ... regularly
engage in a variety of civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising, and other activities worthy of constitutional protection under the First Amendment." Id. at 626-27 (citations omitted).

126. See id. at 626-29.
127. Id. at 627. The Court also rejected the Jaycees' argument that the admission of women as
full voting members would alter a symbolic message illustrated by the fact that women were not
permitted to vote. See id.
128. See id. at 629.
129. Id. at 626.

130. See id. at 628-29.
131. Id. at 628.
132. See id. at 628-29.
133. See id.
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In Jaycees, the Supreme Court constructed the test and set the stage
for future freedom of association cases. Little did the Court know that
the next case to deal with these issues would appear before it in the nottoo-distant future. A mere three years later, Board of Directors of Rotary Internationalv. Rotary Club of Duarte'4wasargued and decided.
B. Board of Directors of Rotary International v.
Rotary Club of Duarte
Rotary International ("International") was a nonprofit corporation
composed solely of "'business and professional men.""35 Each member
of a Rotary Club was admitted pursuant to a "classification system,"'3 6
and was required to work in a leadership capacity in a business or profession.'3 7 International's recommended club by-laws provided that all
applicants be considered by a classifications committee which would
determine whether the applicant's business is accurately described and
conforms to the classification system. 3 1 The by-laws further provided
for a membership committee which would "evaluate[] the candidate's
'character, business and social standing, and general eligibility."' 39 Although membership was limited to men, women attended meetings, received awards, and gave speeches."
In 1977, the Rotary Club of Duarte, California ("Duarte Club")
4
admitted three women in violation of the Rotary Club Constitution.' '
Upon informing the Duarte Club that its actions violated club policy,
International's Board of Directors conducted an internal hearing, re-

134. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
135. Id. at 539 (quoting ROTARY MANUAL OFPROCEDURE 7 (1981)).
136. See id. at 540.
[The Rotary Club's classification system] ensure[s) "that each Rotary Club includes a
representative of every worthy and recognized business, professional, or institutional
activity in the community." ... The general rule is that "one active member is admitted
for each classification, but he, in turn, may propose an additional active member, who
must be in the same business or professional classification."
Id. (quoting 2 ROTARY BASIC LBRARY, CLUB SERViCE 7, 67-69 (1981)). Rotary Clubs may create
subcategories of a classified business or profession if the subclassification "'describe[s] the member's principal and recognized professional activity."' Id. (quoting 2 ROTARY BASIC LIBRARY,
CLUB SERVICE 8 (1981)) (alteration in original). Therefore, there may be two representatives for
each classification. See U42at 540 n.1.
137. See id. at 540.
138. See id.
139. Id. at 540-41.
140. See id. at 541.
141. See id.
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Club's charter, and terminated the club's membership
voked the Duarte
142
in International.
The Duarte Club, and two of its female members, filed a complaint
in a California state court alleging that International's actions violated
the state's public accommodation law, the UCRA.' 43 The lower court
found for International, and held that no violation of the UCRA occurred because neither International nor the Duarte Club were business
establishments under the UCRA. 44 The California Court of Appeals reversed, finding both International and the Duarte Club to be business
establishments within the meaning of the UCRA and therefore governed
by its provisions.'45 The court rejected International's argument that its
all male membership policy was protected by the First Amendment
right of freedom of association, and ordered reinstatement of the Duarte
Club.'" Since the California Supreme Court denied International's petition for review, the United States Supreme Court, finding appellate jurisdiction, granted International's petition for certiorari, and affirmed
the decision of the California Court of Appeals. 47
The Court began its analysis by reaffirming Jaycees as the
"framework for analyzing [International's] constitutional claims."148 The
Court restated the two types of associational freedoms, and briefly explained the basis for each. 49 Although the Rotary Club opinion reiterates, for the most part, the principles set forth in Jaycees, the Court further clarified in two ways the freedom of intimate association analysis
previously set forth in Jaycees. First, the Court explained that although
the types of relationships that have been afforded the protection of freedom of intimate association have typically been familial in nature, the
Court had not attempted to define the boundaries of this constitutional
right, and had never held that it was limited to family relationships. 50
The second clarification, set forth in a footnote, was in response to In142. See id.
143. See id. For an examination of the UCRA, see supraPart II.
144. See Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 542.
145. See id. at 542-43.
146. See id. at 543.
147. See id. at 543-44. Justices Blackmun and O'Connor did not participate in the consideration of Rotary Club, and Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment. See id. at 538.
148. Id. at 544.
149. See id. at 544-49. The Court explained that the Jaycees opinion did not consider whether
the relationships among the Kiwanis Club members were adequately intimate to warrant constitutional protection. See id. at 547 n.6. The discussion of the Kiwanis Club was limited to the observation that because the Minnesota court suggested the Kiwanis Clubs were not covered by the
MHIRA, the Jaycees argument that the MHRA was vague and overbroad failed. See id.
150. See id. at 545.
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ternational's argument that the Court "'approved' a distinction between
the Jaycees and the Kiwanis Club in [Jaycees].'' The Court rejected
this argument as a misinterpretation of Jaycees, and reaffirmed the factspecific nature of a freedom of intimate association analysis. The
Court refused to speculate as to the applicability of the constitutional
right to the "many clubs and other entities with selective membership
that are found throughout the country [because w]hether the 'zone of
privacy' established by the First Amendment extends to a particular
club or entity requires a careful inquiry into the objective characteristics
of the particular relationships at issue." '53
The Court applied the freedom of intimate association factors
stated in Jaycees ("size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others are
excluded from critical aspects of the relationship")' 4 and held that the
relationships among the members of International and Duarte Club were
insufficiently private and intimate to warrant constitutional protection.'55
The Court noted that the size of local Rotary Clubs can range from less
than twenty to greater than 900, and emphasized that there was no upper
limit on the number of members in any local Rotary Club.'56 Rotary
Clubs are required to admit other Club members to meetings, and are
encouraged to seek local media coverage of their activities and events. 7
In short, although Rotary Club membership is not open to the general
public, "Rotary Clubs, rather than carrying on their activities in an atmosphere of privacy,
seek to keep their 'windows and doors open to the
1 58
whole world.'
The Court, following the Jaycees framework, applied the freedom
of expressive association test, and held that this constitutional protection
was also unavailable to the Rotary Clubs.'59 The Court stated that admitting women to Rotary Clubs would not significantly alter the existing members' ability to pursue their various activities, nor would it require them to "abandon their basic goals ... [or] their classification
system."' ' ° In any event, even if the application of the UCRA slightly
encroaches the Rotary Club's members' right to expressive association,
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 547 n.6.
See id. at 547-48 n.6.
Id. at 548 n.6 (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984)).
Id. at 546.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 547.
Id. (quoting 1 ROTARYBASiCLIBRARY, Focus ON ROTARY 60-61 (1981)).
See id. at 548-49.
Id. at 548.
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such encroachment is justified because it effectuates
the state's compel1 61
ling interest in eliminating gender discrimination.

By this time, freedom of association had become the "hot issue,"
and one year later the Court was once again confronted with it in New
York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York.' 62
C. New York State Club Association v. City of New York

In 1984, New York City amended its anti-discrimination public accommodation statute, the Human Rights Law ("HRL"), extending its
reach and clarifying its private club exemption.'6 Immediately thereaf-

ter, the New York State Club Association ("Association"), a nonprofit
corporation consisting of 125 private clubs and associations in New

York State, most of which were located in New York City, filed suit
against the city and its officers alleging, among other things, that the
HRL was facially unconstitutional on First and Fourteenth Amendment
grounds.' 6' The trial court upheld the HRL, and the intermediate court
affirmed.' 6s The New York State Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
161. See id. at549.
162. 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
163. See id. at 5-7.
The Human Rights Law (Local Law No. 97 of 1965) makes it "an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement,
because of the race, creed, color, national origin or sex of any person directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof ......
Id. at 4 n.1 (quoting N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(2) (1986)). "The city has also extended the
[Human Rights Law's ("HRL")I coverage to discrimination against 'an otherwise qualified person
who is physically or mentally handicapped,' [N.Y.C. Admin. Code] § 8-108, and to discrimination
against 'individuals because of their actual or perceived sexual orientations,' [N.Y.C. Admin.
Code] § 8-108.1." Id. at 4-5 n.1.
The amended HRL extended the anti-discrimination provisions to any "'institution, club
or place of accommodation [that] has more than four hundred members, provides regular meal
service and regularly receives payment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities, services, meals or
beverages directly or indirectly from or on behalf of nonmembers for the furtherance of trade or
business."' Id. at 6 (quoting N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9) (1986)) (alteration in original). "Any
such club 'shall not be considered in its nature distinctly private."' Id. at 6 (quoting N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9) (1986)).
The amended private club exception provides in part:
[A]ny such club "shall be deemed to be in its nature distinctly private" if it is "a corporation incorporated under the benevolent orders law or described in the benevolent orders law but formed under any law of this state, or a religious corporation incorporated
under the education law or the religious corporations laws."
Id. at 6-7 (quoting N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9) (1986)).
164. See id. at 7-9.
165. See id. at7.
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courts' holdings in a unanimous opinion in which it rejected the First
Amendment challenge, relying on the balancing test set forth in Jaycees
and reaffirmed in Rotary Club.' The Association's petition for certiorari was granted, and the Supreme Court subsequently affirmed.' 67
The Court focused its analysis on the facial challenge to the HRL,
thereby briefly discussing and quickly rejecting the freedom of association allegations.' 6 The Court held that the clubs and associations comprising the Association were unable to avail themselves of either associational right.169 With regard to the Association's purported right to
intimate association, the court emphasized that the clubs subject to the
HRL were predominantly commercial in nature 7 ' and contained at least
400 members.17 1 The large membership made them comparable in size
to the Jaycees and larger than many of the local Rotary Clubs, both of
which were not afforded constitutional protection.7 2 The Court noted:
"It may well be that a considerable amount of private or intimate association occurs in such a setting, ... but that fact alone does not afford
the entity as a whole any constitutional immunity to practice discrimi-

nation

.

. .,173

The Court also abruptly rejected the Association's expressive association argument. It stated that most large clubs subject to the HRL
are not associations "organized for specific expressive purposes ... that
[can]not... advocate [their] desired viewpoints nearly as effectively if
[they] cannot confine [their] membership[s] to those who share the
same sex, for example, or the same religion. '.' 74 The Association failed
to identify those clubs that possessed such characteristics, and the Court
refused to provide constitutional protection to any one club, "let alone a
substantial number of them."'175
166. See id. at 7-8. The New York State Court of Appeals held that any infringement on the
Association's existing members' right to expressive association due to the application of the HRL
was justified because it was the least restrictive means to achieve the state's goal of eliminating
invidious discrimination. See id.
167. See id. at 8.
168. Seeid. at11.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 12. The Court noted that the HRL only applies to clubs offering "'regular meal
service' and receiv[ing] regular payments 'directly or indirectly from or on behalf of nonmembers
for the furtherance of trade or business."' Id. (quoting N.Y.C. Admin. Code. § 8-102(9) (1986)).
These characteristics, as well as the role strangers play in the clubs' happenings, led the Court to
conclude that the clubs were commercial in nature. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id.

173. Id.
174. Id. at 13.
175. Id. at 14.
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New York State Club Ass'n concluded the seemingly constant barrage of freedom of association cases, and provided the Court with a
temporary respite from these issues. Since nothing in the law remains
dormant for too long, in 1995 the Court was once again faced with these
and other First Amendment issues in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group.7 6 Although the Court's analysis in Hurley
was concerned with freedom of speech, the Court provided a brief freedom of association discussion.'7
D. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group
In 1992, a group of gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendants of Irish
immigrants formed a group, the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston ("GLIB"), for the express purpose of marching
in the South Boston St. Patrick's Day-Evacuation Day Parade. 78 Although the organizers of the parade, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council ("Council"), denied GLIB's application to participate in
the 1992 parade, GLIB obtained a state court order requiring their inclusion and marched pursuant thereto.179 In 1993, after the Council again
denied GLIB's application to march in the parade, GLIB brought suit
claiming the Council's discriminatory acts violated the State and Federal Constitutions and the state public accommodation statute.'
The trial court held that the parade satisfied the statutory definition
of "public accommodation" and was therefore subject to the statute.'
The court rejected the Council's expressive association argument on the
grounds that this type of constitutional protection would require the
court to focus on a particular message, theme, or organization absent

176. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
177. Seeid. at580-81.
178. See id. at 561.
179. See id.
180. See id. In 1995, Massachusetts' "public accommodations law ... prohibit[ed] 'any distinction, discrimination or restriction on account of... sexual orientation ... relative to the admission of any person to, or treatment in any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement."' Id. (quoting MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (Supp. 1992)) (second and third omissions in
original).
181. See id. at 561-62. The trial court relied on the portion of the Massachusetts' public accommodation law which defined a public accommodation to include "'any place... which is open
to and accepts or solicits the patronage of the general public and, without limiting the generality of
this definition, whether or not it be... (6) a boardwalk or other public highway [or] ... (8) a place
of public amusement, recreation, sport, exercise or entertainment."' Id. (quoting MAss. GEN.
LAWS ch. 272, § 92A (1990)) (omissions and alteration in original).
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from the parade.1 8 "'Given the [Council's] lack of selectivity in choosing participants and failure to circumscribe the marchers' message,' the
court found it 'impossible to discern any specific expressive purpose
183
entitling the Parade to protection under the First Amendment.'
Moreover, the trial court found any possible infringement on the
Council's right to expressive association to be slight-justified by the
state's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination.'1 4 The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed, l but held that the Council's
First Amendment freedom of speech argument (as distinguished from
the Council's freedom of association argument discussed in the trial
court) "need not [be] decide[d] on the particular First Amendment theory involved" because the Council did not "'demonstrate that the parade
truly was an exercise of ... First Amendment rights." ' 6 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari,t 7 and later reversed the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.' The Court, relying on a freedom of speech analysis, held that the forced inclusion of
GLIB violated the Council's First Amendment rights."9
The Court first rejected the Supreme Judicial Court's conclusion
that a parade has no expressive purpose and is therefore not entitled to
constitutional protection."' It then acknowledged Massachusetts' public
accommodation law as a tool in the fight against discrimination; however, it was puzzled by the statute's peculiar application in the instant
case. " ' The Council did not prohibit individuals that were openly gay,
lesbian, or bisexual to march in the parade"n since such actions would
182. See id. at563.
183. Id. (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. B24) (alteration in original).
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. Id. at 564 (omission in original).
187. See id. at 566.
188. See id. at 581.
189. See id. at 568-81.
190. See id. at 568-70. The Court stated "that '[s]ymbolism is a primitive but effective way of
communicating ideas"' and proceeded to cite a string of Supreme Court cases that supported this
premise. Id. at 569 (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943))
(alteration in original). "[A] narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection," such that "a private speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection simply by
combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes to isolate an exact message as the
exclusive subject matter of the speech." Id. at 569-70. Moreover, "'[slince all speech inherently
involves choices of what to say and what to leave unsaid,' one important manifestation of the
principle of free speech is that one who chooses to speak may also decide 'what not to say."' Id. at
573 (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986)) (plurality
opinion) (citation omitted).
191. See id. at 571-73.
192. See id. at 572.
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arguably be discriminatory. Instead, the Council denied admission to
GLIB "as its own parade unit carrying its own banner."1' 93 While the parade took place in public, the Court held that the Council's selection
process for marching units was not a public accommodation, but rather
an exhibition of free speech."9 Thus, the forced inclusion of GLIB infringed upon the Council's right to free speech, and was therefore unconstitutional.' 9'
In the second to last paragraph of the opinion, the Court briefly
discussed the possible applicability of the Council's right to freedom of
association.'96 The Court reiterated the freedom of association holding in
New York State Club Ass'n,'97 and stated that "[ilf[it] were to analyze
this case strictly along those lines, GLIB would lose." ' Just as a private
club may deny membership to an applicant with opposing views, the
Council may refuse admission to GLIB on the basis that it is an
"expressive contingent with its own message...
Since the Court has not said otherwise, the Jaycees test is still the
framework for analyzing a freedom of association claim. Although the
Court has not heard another freedom of association case since Hurley, it
is only a matter of time. The split in the state courts regarding the
BSA's right to intimate and/or expressive association is ripe for Supreme Court resolution.

IV. HOMOSEXUALS AND THE BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA
The BSA, incorporated in 1910 and chartered by Congress in 1916,
is a corporation that provides, among other things, an educational program for boys and young men that helps "to build character, to train in
the responsibilities of participating citizenship, and to develop personal
fitness."' Since 1910, there have been more than ninety million members of the BSA, and as of December 31, 1993, BSA membership was
5,355,401.sl
193. Id.
194. See id. at 573.
195. See id. at 580-81.
196. See id.

197. "[Alithough the association provided public benefits to which a State could ensure equal
access, it was also engaged in expressive activity; compelled access to the benefit, which was upheld, did not trespass on the organization's message itself." Id. at 580.
198. Id. (emphasis added).
199. Id. at 580-81.
200. About the BSA (visited Apr. 19, 1999)
<http://www.bsa.scouting.org/navlpub/main.html>.
201.

See HistoricalHighlights- 1990's (visited Apr. 19, 1999)
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The purpose of the BSA, as set forth in its charter, is "to promote,
through organization, and cooperation with other agencies, the ability of

boys to do things for themselves and others, to train them in Scoutcraft,
and to teach them patriotism, courage, self-reliance, and kindred virtues,
using the methods which are now in common use by Boy Scouts."'2 m The
BSA by-laws further provide: "In achieving this purpose, emphasis shall
be placed upon its educational program and the oaths, promises, and
codes of the Scouting program for character development, citizenship
training, and mental and physical fitness."' ' Finally, the BSA Mission
Statement states:
It is the mission of the Boy Scouts of America to serve others by
helping to instill values in young people and, in other ways, to prepare
them to make ethical choices over their lifetime in achieving their full
potential.
The values we strive to instill are based on those found in the Scout
Oath and Law.Y
To effectuate the above purpose and goals, the BSA offers five
programs solely for boys and young men: the Tiger Cubs,205 Cub Scout-

ing,20 Webelos Scouting,0 Boy Scouting,20 and Varsity Scouting.
<http:llwww.bsa.scouting.orglfactsheets/02-511/1990.html> [hereinafter HistoricalHighlights-

1990's].
CHARTER AND BYLAWS OF THE BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, § 3, at 3 (1993).
203. Id. art.I, § 2, at 6.
204. Boy Scouts of America Adult Registration Application, No. 28-501M.
The Scout Oath states:
"On my honor I will do my best
To do my duty to God and my country
and to obey the Scout Law;
To help other people at all times;
To keep myself physically strong,
mentally awake, and morally straight."
BIaKBY,supra note 1,at 549.
"The Scout Law is a statement of facts: 'A Scout is trustworthy... loyal... helpfil...
friendly... courteous... kind.., obedient... cheerful... thrifty.., brave.., clean... reverent. "' Id. at 553 (omissions in original).
205. The Tiger Cubs is "[a] school-year program for first-grade (or 7-year-old) boys and their
adult partners that stresses simplicity, shared leadership, learning about the community, and family
understanding. Each boy-adult team meets for family activities, then once or twice a month all the
teams meet for Tiger Cub group activities." Scouting Programs (visited Mar. 28, 1999)
<http:llwww.bsa.scouting.orglprogramsindex.html>.
206. Cub Scouting is "[a] family- and home-centered program for boys in the second through
fifth grade (or 8, 9, and 10 years old). Cub Scouting's emphasis is on quality program (sic] at the
local level, where the most boys and families are involved." Id.
207. The Webelos Scouts "(WE'll BE LOyal Scouts)" are "[flourth- and fifth-grade (or 10202.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol27/iss4/5

26

Goodman: A Scout is Morally Straight, Brave, Clean, Trustworthy...and Hete

1999]

GAYS IN THE BOY SCOUTS

Youth membership is limited to males who satisfy the program's age
requirement, who recognize an obligation to God pursuant to the BSA
Declaration of Religious Principle, 210 and who promise to observe the
Scout Oath or Promise2 and the Scout Law.2 2 Adult volunteers2"3 must
be recommended by the Scout Executive, and approved by the Council

year-old) boys ...[who] participate in more advanced activities that begin to prepare them to become Boy Scouts." Id.
208. Boy Scouting is "[a] program for boys 11 through 17 designed to achieve the aims of
Scouting through a vigorous outdoor program and peer group leadership with the counsel of an
adult Scoutmaster. (Boys also may become Boy Scouts if they have earned the Arrow of Light
Award or have completed the fifth grade.)." Id.
209. Varsity Scouting is "[an active, exciting program for young men 14 through 17 built
around five program fields of emphasis: advancement, high adventure, personal development,
service, and special programs and events." Id.
210. The BSA Declaration of Religious Principle provides:
The [BSA] maintains that no member can grow into the best kind of citizen without
recognizing an obligation to God. In the first part of the Scout Oath or Promise the
member declares, "On my honor I will do my best to do my duty to God and my country and to obey the Scout Law." The recognition of God as the ruling and leading
power in the universe and the grateful acknowledgment of His favors and blessings are
necessary to the best type of citizenship and are wholesome precepts in the education of
the growing members. No matter what the religious faith of the members may be, this
fundamental need of good citizenship should be kept before them. The [BSA], therefore, recognizes the religious element in the training of the member, but it is absolutely
nonsectarian in its attitude toward that religious training. Its policy is that the home and
the organization or group with which the member is connected shall give definite attention to religious life....
Only persons willing to subscribe to these declarations of
principles shall be entitled to certificates of leadership in carrying out the Scouting program.
CHARTER AND BYLAWS OF THE BoY ScouTs OF AMERICA, supra note 202, art. IX, § 1, cl. 1, 4, at
17.
211. For Tiger Cubs, Cub Scouts, and Webelos Scouts, the Scout Promise is equivalent to the
Boy Scouts' Oath. The Tiger Cub Promise provides:
"I promise to love God,
my family, and my
country, and to lear
about the world."
Boy Scouts of America Application to Join a Pack, No. 28-102D. The Cub Scout Promise provides:
"I, (name), promise
To do my best
To do my duty to God and my country,
To help other people, and
To obey the Law of the Pack."
Id.
212. See supra note 204; Boy Scouts of America Application to Join Boy Scouting, No. 28209M.
213. Adult volunteers include: Scoutmasters; assistant Scoutmasters; den leaders; assistant
den leaders; Cubmasters; assistant Cubmasters; Webelos den leaders; and assistant Webelos den
leaders. See Boy Scouts of America Adult Registration Application, supra note 204.
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Executive Board.214 They "must possess the moral, educational, and
emotional qualities that the [BSA] deems necessary to afford positive

leadership to youth, 215 they must be United States citizens, be the correct age,21 6 and they must pledge to believe in and follow the Declaration
of Religious Principle, the Scout Oath or Promise, and the Scout Law.2 7
Despite the lack of selectivity in the BSA's membership process,
the BSA often finds itself the defendant in a case brought by a rejected
BSA applicant. The plaintiffs/rejected applicants are usually women,
atheists, agnostics, and homosexuals.2 8
In defense of its decision to exclude women, the BSA argues that
allowing women to become members runs contrary to the very purpose
behind the formation of the all male scouting group.2"9 It argues that the
numerous "male" references in the BSA charter and by-laws support

this proposition.m The BSA further states that although it is nonsectarian, all youth and adult members must recognize a duty to God." This

long standing position can also be found in the BSA's by-laws under
"Declaration of Religious Principle."' Finally, the BSA also maintains
that publicly avowed homosexuals cannot be members.2n Who the homosexuals are, and what they represent, is contrary to the BSA's beliefs. 224 Unlike the BSA's stance on women and atheists, its views on

gays are not in their charter or by-laws. As evidence of its position, the
BSA points to the terms "morally straight" and "clean" as well as a

1978 internal memorandum, a 1983 written statement, and 1991 and
1993 position statements. m
214. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270, 276 (N.J. Super. Ct App. Div. 1998),
affid, No. A-1951196-97, 1999 NJ. LEXIS 995, at *1 (Aug. 4, 1999).
215. Boy Scouts of America Adult Registration Application, supra note 204.
216. All applicants for leadership positions must be at least 21 years of age. See id Applicants for assistant adult volunteer positions must be 18 years of age or older. See id.
217. See id.
218. See supra note 8.
219. See Yeaw v. Boy Scouts of Am., 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 85, 85-86 n.1 (1997).
220. See id. at 86-87.
221. See Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1268 (7th Cir. 1993); Randall v. Orange County Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 261, 264-65 (Cal. 1998); Seaboum v. Coronado Area Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 891 P.2d 385, 395 (Kan. 1995).
222. See supra note 210.
223. See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 225 n.5
(Cal. 1998); Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270,290 (N.J. Super. Ct App. Div. 1998), aff'd,
No. A-195/196-97, 1999 N.J. LEXIS 995, at *1 (Aug. 4, 1999); Richardson v. Chicago Area
Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., No. 92-E-80, 1996 WL 734724, at *1 (Chi. Comm'n Hum. Rel.
Feb. 21, 1996), afftd, No. 96 CH 03266, at 1 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook County Aug. 12, 1999)
(unpublished opinion) (on, file with the Hofstra Law Review).
224. See Dale, 706 A.2d at 277; Richardson, 1996 WL 734724, at *10.
225. See Curran,952 P.2d at 225 n.5, 225-26 n.7; Dale, 706 A.2d at 288-90; Richardson,
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The terms "morally straight" and "clean" are located in the Scout
Oath and Scout Law, respectively. 6 The definitions of the Scout Oath
phrases and Scout Law terms are found in the Boy Scout Handbook.
Accordingly, to be a morally straight Scout one must strive:
To be a person of strong character, guide your life with honesty, purity, and justice. Respect and defend the rights of all people. Your relationships with others should be honest and open. Be clean in your
speech and actions, and faithful in your religious beliefs. The values
you follow as a Scout will help you become virtuous and self-reliant?227
As described in the Scout Law, a "clean" Scout "keeps his body
and mind fit and clean. He chooses the company of those who live by
'z
these same ideals. He helps keep his home and community clean."
The Handbook goes on to explain:
You never need to be ashamed of dirt that will wash off. If you play
hard and work hard you can't help getting dirty. But when the game is
over or the work is done, that kind of dirt disappears with soap and
water.
There's another kind of dirt that won't come off by washing. It is the
kind that shows up in foul language and harmful thoughts.
Swear words, profanity, and dirty stories are weapons that ridicule
other people and hurt their feelings. The same is true of racial slurs and
jokes making fun of ethnic groups or people with physical or mental
limitations. A Scout knows there is no kindness or honor in such
mean-spirited behavior. He avoids it in his own words and deeds. He
defends those who are targets of insults.229
The BSA consistently argues that the forced inclusion of homosexuals
runs contrary to the meaning of these terms.
The 1978 memo is a policy statement, in question and answer format, addressed to the BSA's Executive Council from its Chief Scout
Executive.20 It was never openly distributed within the BSA hierarchy." 1 The memo states in relevant part:

1996 WL 734724, at *30-*32.
226.
227.
228.
229.

See supra note 204.
BMRKBY,supranote 1, at 551 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 561 (emphasis omitted).
Id.

230. See Richardson, 1996 WL 734724, at *10.
231. See id. at *31.
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Q. May an individual who openly declares himself to be a homosexual
be a volunteer Scout leader?
A. No. The [BSA] is a private, membership organization and leadership therein is a privilege and not a right. We do not believe that homosexuality and leadership in Scouting are appropriate. We will continue to select those who in our judgment meet our standards and
qualifications for leadership.
Q. May an individual who openly declares himself to be a homosexual
be a registered unit member?
A. No. As the [BSA] is a private, membership organization, participation in the program is a privilege and not a right. We do not feel that
membership of such individuals is in the best interests of Scouting. zn
The next written declaration concerning the BSA's view on homosexuals was the 1983 statement from the Legal Counsel of the BSA. It
states: "Avowed or known homosexuals are not permitted to register in
the [BSA]. Membership in the organization is a privilege, not a right,
and the [BSA] has determined that homosexuality and Scouting are not
compatible. No units will be chartered to known homosexual groups or
individuals." 3
The 1991 Position Statement states:
We believe that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the requirement in the Scout Oath that a Scout be morally straight and in the
Scout Law that a Scout be clean in word and deed, and that homosexuals do not provide a desirable role model for Scouts.
Because of these beliefs, the [BSA] does not accept homosexuals as
members or as leaders, whether in volunteer or professional capacities.
Our position on this issue is based solely upon our desire to provide
the appropriate environment and role models which reflect Scouting's
values and beliefs.2
In 1993, the BSA refined and redrafted the 1991 Position Statement to state:
232. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 225-26 n.7
(Cal. 1998).
233.

Id. at 225 n.5.

234. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270, 290 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), aff'd,
No. A-195/196-97, 1999 NJ. LEXIS 995, at *1 (Aug. 4, 1999).
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The [BSA] does not ask prospective members about their sexual preference, nor do we check on the sexual orientation of boys who are already Scouts.
The reality is that Scouting serves children who have no knowledge of,
or interest in, sexual preference. We allow youth to live as children
and enjoy Scouting and its diversity without immersing them in the
politics of the day.
Membership in Scouting is open to all youth who meet basic requirements for membership and who agree to live by the applicable oath
and law ....
The [BSA] has always reflected the expectations that Scouting families
have had for the organization.
We do not believe that homosexuals provide a role model consistent
with these expectations.
Accordingly, we do not allow for the registration of avowed homosexuals as members or as leaders of the BSA. 5
The 1993 Position Statement makes clear that the BSA will deny the
applications of both homosexual adults and youth, and expel any current
homosexual members.
Utilizing the above arguments and evidence, the BSA has been
successful in excluding women, atheists, and agnostics.6 Its battle

against the forced inclusion of homosexuals, however, has been decidedly more difficult.
The highest court in California,2' 7 an appellate court in New Jer3
sey,2 and the Chicago Commission on Human Relations 2 9 all have
ruled on cases involving gays and the BSA. The New Jersey and California courts both ruled on whether the BSA, as a public accommoda235. Id. at 276-77.
236. See supra note 8.
237. See Curran, 952 P.2d at 218.
238. See Dale, 706 A.2d at 270. For a discussion of the New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion
and order affirming the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, see infra notes 470-96,
and accompanying text.
239. See Richardson v. Chicago Area Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., No. 92-E-80, 1996
WL 734724, at *1 (Chi. Comm'n Hum. Rel. Feb. 21, 1996), affd, No. 96 CH 03266, at 1 (111.Cir.
Ct. Cook County Aug. 12, 1999) (unpublished opinion) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review). For
a discussion of the Circuit Court of Cook County's opinion and order affirming the Chicago
Commission on Human Relations, see infra notes 470-73,497-505 and accompanying text.
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tion, must admit publicly avowed homosexuals.m The Chicago Commission on Human Relations ruled on whether the BSA, pursuant to
Chicago's employment ordinance, must employ a homosexual. 4' While
the New Jersey and California courts' holdings were diametrical, this
dichotomy may be attributable, in part, to the differences in each of the
states' public accommodation laws. Of particular interest to this Note is
the fact that the Superior Court of New Jersey and the Chicago Commission on Human Relations concluded that the BSA's associational
rights were not violated, whereas the California Superior Court, in a
concurring opinion, concluded they were. The judicial opinions of Dale
v. Boy Scouts of America 2 and Curranv. Mount Diablo Council of the
Boy Scouts of Americae4 and the administrative opinion of Richardson
v. Chicago Area Council of the Boy Scouts of America are summarized below, with an emphasis on the courts' and commission's rationale concerning the BSA's right to freedom of association.
A. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America
James Dale had been associated with the Boy Scouts of America
for most of his life.245 He joined the Cub Scouts when he was eight and
as he grew older, progressed through the corresponding BSA programs.24 Throughout his BSA tenure, Dale earned thirty merit badges,
held many troop leadership positions, including junior assistant Scoutmaster, and, as a symbol of his devotion and exemplary Boy Scout conduct, achieved the highest rank of Eagle Scout.24 7 He had been active in
and received from the Order of the Arrow, an affiliated camping association, the highest possible honor of Vigil.. 8 He was also chosen as a
delegate to the 1985 National Boy Scout Jamboree and was selected to
speak at numerous Monmouth Boy Scout Council functions.249
In March, 1989, seven months after his eighteenth birthday, Dale
applied for adult registration membership, a prerequisite for service as a
5 His membership was approved,
volunteer adult leader.2
and when he
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

See Curran,952 P.2d at 219; Dale, 706 A.2d at 274.
See Richardson,1996 WL 734724, at *1.
706 A.2d 270 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998).
No. 92-E-80, 1996 WL 734724, at *1 (Chi. Comm'n Hum. Rel. Feb. 21, 1996).
See Dale, 706 A.2d at 275.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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was not away attending college at Rutgers University, he served as an
assistant Scoutmaster in a local troop."'
Dale publicly declared his homosexuality during his second year at
Rutgers. z Thereafter he participated in a newspaper article entitled
Seminar Addresses Needs of Homosexual Teens, in which he was described as the co-president of the Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay Alliance and was quoted as saying that he had only pretended to be straight
during high school." 3
On August 5, 1990, when Dale was twenty years old, he was informed in a letter from James W. Kay, Council Executive of Monmouth
Council, that his adult registration had been revoked and that he should
"sever" all relations with the BSA.2- Kay further stated that "BSA
membership registration is a privilege ...[that may be] refuse[d] ...
whenever there is a concern that an individual may not meet the high
standards of membership which the BSA seeks to provide for American
youth." " In a letter dated August 10, 1990, Kay responded to Dale's inquiries regarding the grounds for his expulsion. Kay stated that Dale's
membership was revoked pursuant to the BSA's "standards for leadership ... which specifically forbid membership to homosexuals. '' 6 Kay
later explained in a deposition that the newspaper article had been
brought to his attention and that by publicly avowing his homosexuality,
Dale illustrated his failure to live by the Scout Oath and Law.2 7 Dale
was subsequently told that since the BSA Northeast Region Review
Committee supported his expulsion, his presence at the regional review
meeting would have "no useful purpose." 8
Dale filed suit against the BSA alleging that the BSA is a public
accommodation under New Jersey's public accommodation law, the
LAD, and that its discriminatory conduct violated the LAD.'29 The BSA
argued that it did not satisfy the LAD's definition of a public accommodation, that it was a private club pursuant to the LAD's private club exception, and, in the alternative, that if it were deemed a public accom-

251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See id.
258. Id. at 275-76.
259. See id. at 277. For an examination of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination
("LAD"), see supra PartII.
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modation, the forced inclusion of homosexuals would violate its members' right to freedom of association.2 °
The trial court found for the BSA, concluding that since the BSA
has no fixed physical locale, the BSA is not a place of public accommodation under the LAD.26' The court further noted that the BSA is a distinctly private organization qualifying under the LAD's private club exception.as2 Finally, the trial judge concluded that the BSA's members'
right to expressive association would be violated if the BSA were forced
to accept homosexuals as members m He stated that "'[a]ccording to
[the BSA's] mission and purpose, [it] has determined that an assistant
scoutmaster who is an active sodomist is simply incompatible with
scouting and is not morally straight.'"4
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division reversed the
trial court decision, and held that the BSA was in fact a public accommodation under the LAD, that the BSA had violated the LAD by discriminating against the Plaintiff on the basis of sexual orientation, and
that the forced inclusion of homosexuals does not abridge the BSA's
right to expressive association.m
The court began by examining the factors that combine to qualify
an organization as a "place of public accommodation."2 66 The court rejected the trial court's conclusion that to qualify as a "place of public
accommodation" an organization must be linked to a fixed physical
place.s 7 Such a conclusion is "irrational" because people who "operate
from a fixed 'place' are [no] more apt to discriminate than those who
meet at varying locales."'
Advertisements that encourage new membership as well as lenient membership criteria were found to be additional factors that could render an association a public accommodation.ms
The Superior Court held that the BSA is a public accommodation
and subject to the anti-discrimination provisions of the LAD.270 The

260. See Dale, 706 A.2d at 277-93.
261. See id. at 277-78.
262. See id. at 277.
263. See id.
264. I. at 288 (first alteration in original).
265. See id. at 274. The court also rejected the BSA's claim that it was exempt from the statute under the LAD's private club exception. See id at 283.
266. See id. at 278-83.
267. See id. at 278-80.
268. Id. at 279.
269. See id. at 280-83.
270. See id. at 283.
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BSA's advertising campaigns to induce new membership and their invitation to the general public at large "to join their ranks" were two factors that the court placed great emphasis on.27' The court rejected the
BSA's argument that the proper focus should be on the "more restrictive
and selective" adult membership, but rather examined the anti-gay
membership policy of the BSA as a national association.2 2 Finally, the
court noted the BSA's partnership and involvement with numerous
public entities and organizations 73 This holding, while settling an important issue, opened the door to an even larger one-the possible infringement of the BSA's constitutional rights.
The Superior Court's inquiry into the possible violation of the
BSA's right to intimate and/or expressive association began with a
summary of the rules set forth in Jaycees, Rotary Club, and New York
Club Ass'n. It laid out the different criteria for the two associational
freedoms and concluded that an "organization or club asserting the freedom has a substantial burden of demonstrating a strong relationship
between its expressive activities and its discriminatory practice."2 74
The BSA was unable to avail itself of the right to intimate association. The court, in one paragraph, quickly eliminated any possible discussion of this right by noting that the BSA has five million members,
that it engages in aggressive advertising, and that it is involved in the
activities of public entities including public schools.' 5 These characteristics and actions nullify many of the intimate association factors,
thereby rendering the right inapplicable. 6
The court's rejection of the BSA's argument that the inclusion of
gays violated its right to expressive association required a more in depth
analysis. The court began by accepting the fundamental premise that the
BSA's social, educational, and civic goals and activities were in fact
expressive and protected by the First Amendment.'l The court ultimately concluded that "the BSA's collective 'expressive purpose' is not
to condemn homosexuality" but rather, as stated in its Charter, bylaws

271. See id. at 280-81. The court mentioned the BSA's national television campaigns, its
public relations firms, the production of magazine inserts, local councils' radio and television
spots, and "school nights." See id. at 281.
272. See id. at 282. "Wereject the suggestion that the BSA organization as a whole is not a
place of public accommodation because more stringent membership criteria are applied to a single
component of the organization, its adult members." Id.
273. See id. at 282-83.
274. Id. at 287.
275. See id. at 286.
276. See supraPart Il.A.1.
277. See Dale, 706 A.2d at 287-88.
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and mission statement, to train and educate boys in outdoor activities,
patriotism, courage, and respect for the family.28 Therefore, including
homosexuals would not significantly alter or affect "the BSA's ability
to express its collective views on scouting, or to instill in the scouts
those qualities of leadership, courage and integrity to which the BSA
has traditionally adhered.""ns
In support of its argument that avowed homosexuals are "at odds"
with its expressive purpose, the BSA pointed to the Scout Oath term
"morally straight," the Scout Law term "clean," the 1978 internal
memorandum and the 1991 and 1993 Position Statements.' 0 The BSA
maintained that homosexuals cannot effectively disseminate the BSA's
morally straight values when a homosexual's "message" conflicts with
the very definitions of "morally straight" and "clean," terms that portray
the BSA's expressive purpose21 The BSA also contended that the 1978
memorandum and the 1991 and 1993 Position Statements further illustrated its collective expressive ideals.m
Both arguments were rejected by the court-the reliance on the
terms "morally straight" and "clean" on the basis of being "of recent
vintage," and the position statements on the grounds of being mere litigation responses. m The court noted that the explanation for the exclusion of gays provided in the 1978 memorandum, which contained the
BSA's first reference to homosexuals, was that the BSA was a private
organization, and not that homosexuality conflicted with the terms
"morally straight" and "clean. ' ' m The court further emphasized that the
Position Statements were produced during the time the BSA's anti-gay
policy was under judicial attack in California. m The court refused to
"accept the proposition that this 'Position Statement,' issued for the first
time seventy-six years after Congress granted the BSA its Charter, represents a collective 'expression' of ideals and beliefs that brought the
boy scouts together." 6
Placing the timing of the production of these documents aside, the
court also found it difficult to reconcile the purported fundamental ex278. See id. at 288.

279. Id.
280. See id at 289-90. There was no reference to the 1983 statement from the Legal Counsel
of the BSA in the Dale opinion.
281. See id.
282. See id.
283. See id.
284. See id.
285. See id. at 290.
286. Id.
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pressive nature of the BSA's anti-gay policy with the complete absence
of this policy from the BSA's Charter, by-laws, rules and regulations,
handbooks, and membership applications.2 This policy was never incorporated into these documents nor distributed "throughout the BSA
hierarchy." Proof of this lack of knowledge was provided by numerous affidavits of present Boy Scouts and adult leaders, all stating that
they did not know such a policy existed.f 9 The court also found irreconcilable the BSA's failure to expel sponsors and heterosexual scouts
who publicly condemn the BSA's anti-gay practice,2' with its adamancy
in excluding homosexual members "who say[] absolutely nothing about
the morality or lifestyle of homosexuals," but who have disclosed their
sexual orientation." This disparity undermined the BSA's argument
"that its collective purpose is to 'exclude individuals who do not share
the views that the club's members wished to promote. '' 92
The BSA's contention that the Supreme Court case Hurley was on
point and binding was also rejected by the court. 3 After a synopsis of
the facts and holding of Hurley, the court distinguished it from the instant action as a freedom of speech case.2 ' It noted that the Hurley
Court did not conduct a freedom of association analysis under the Jaycees test but rather, in dictum, "observed parenthetically" that GLIB
would lose under a freedom of association analysis "because it could be
'refused admission as an expressive contingent with its own message
just as readily as a private club could exclude an applicant whose manifest views were at odds with a position taken by the club's existing
members."'2 95 The court further distinguished Hurley on factual grounds
by stating that "[ujnlike a parade, where the 'marchers ... are making
some sort of collective point,' the BSA is a national organization focusing its energy and resources on activities aimed at the physical, moral
and spiritual development of boys and young men."296 It concluded that

287. See id.
288. Id.
289. See id.
290. See id. at 290-91. The court noted that the United Methodist Church, the Union of
American Hebrew Congregations and other religious organizations that sponsor the BSA have
publicly opposed the BSA's anti-gay policy. See id.
291. Id. at 291.
292. Id. (quoting New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988)).
293. See id. at 293.

294. See id. at 291-93.
295. Id. at 293 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group, 515
U.S. 557,580-81 (1995)).
296. Id. (quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568).
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homosexual members do not "hamper" these goals nor do they impinge
upon the BSA's ability to express its views. 7
An interesting portion of the majority opinion is the rejection of the
trial court's conclusion that an "active sodomist is... incompatible with
' Facially, the conclusion was simply incorrect in that Dale
scouting."298
had been expelled because he was a publicly avowed homosexual, not
because he was "an active sodomist."2 However, the court dug deeper
and observed that such a statement illustrates "the sinister and unspoken
fear that gay scout leaders will somehow cause physical or emotional
injury to scouts, or will instill in them ideas about the homosexual lifestyle."3' While the BSA has never publicly admitted such fears, the
court was fully aware that homophobia and stereotypical notions of homosexuality exist today and, to a certain degree, may underlie the
BSA's anti-gay position.0 1
B. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the
Boy Scouts of America
Like James Dale, Timothy Curran was an exemplary Boy Scout
achieving the highest rank of Eagle Scout, receiving many scouting
honors, and participating in a BSA leadership development program, as
well as the 1977 BSA National Jamboree.' Although his official membership expired on his eighteenth birthday, Curran maintained contact
with the BSA and participated in many of its activities.",
At the age of sixteen, Curran told his parents he was gay.3 4 He had
a gay social life separate from his life at school and had been integrating
himself with the underground active gay youth in the San Francisco Bay
Area.0 5 At seventeen, Curran began calling himself a gay youth activist
and in 1980, he took a male date to his senior prom.3" All of this information was included in a three part article on gay teenagers published

297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

See id.
Id. at 288.
See id. at 288-89.
Id. at 289.
See id.
See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 220 (Cal.

1998).
303.
304.
305.
306.

See id.
See id. at 220-21.
See id. at 221.
See id.
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by the Oakland Tribune in 1980.07 The article was based upon interviews with approximately twenty teenagers, one of whom was Curran."'
The article and Curran's participation in it were brought to the attention of Quentin Alexander, Executive Director of the Mount Diablo
Council of the BSA.3 9 Alexander inquired as to the status of Curran's
BSA membership and, upon learning that he was no longer an active
member, chose to take no further action310
Curran subsequently submitted an application to attend the 1981
BSA National Jamboree. 1' Alexander, relying on the fact that Curran
was not a registered adult member of any BSA troop, sent a letter to
Curran denying his application. 12 Shortly thereafter, Curran called Alexander inquiring as to the reasons for his denial at which time Alexander explained that only registered adult members can attend the Jamboree.31 3 When Curran responded that he would file an adult application
Alexander explained that he would be unable to accept that application.314 Upon further questioning by Curran, Alexander admitted that the
5 Curran
denial of his application was due to Curran's homosexuality."
316
issue.
the
discuss
to
then agreed to meet with Alexander
At that meeting Alexander showed Curran the Oakland Tribune article and asked him "if [he] espoused that lifestyle still. 31 7 Curran responded in the affirmative and stated that "'he specifically wanted to
[be in the scouts]-because he so firmly believed personally in a homosexual lifestyle that there was ... not anything wrong with it, and he
wanted to make sure that other kids understood
that.' 3 8 Alexander then
319
application.
Curran's
of
denial
reiterated the
Curran sought review of his rejected application with the Western
Region of the BSA.3 20 The BSA agreed to conduct a hearing; however, it
stated that if the underlying facts remained the same, a hearing would be

307. See id. at 220.
308. See id.

309. See id. at 221.
310. See id.
311. See id.
312. See id.

313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.

318. Id. at 222 (alteration in original).

319. See id.
320. See id.
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unproductive. 2' Shortly thereafter Curran filed an action alleging,
among other things, that the BSA's denial of his application based
solely upon his avowed homosexuality violated the California public
accommodation statute, the UCRA."
The trial was bifurcated with the first phase limited to the issue of
whether the BSA was a "business establishment" under the UCRA, and
the second phase limited to whether the application of the UCRA would
violate the BSA's members' constitutional rights to intimate and expressive association" 3 The trial court concluded that the BSA was a
"business establishment" and subject to the UCRA, however, it ultimately found for the BSA on the constitutional issue. 24
At the close of the first phase, the trial court concluded that although the facts of the case and the circumstances surrounding the BSA
were not on point with California's case law interpreting the UCRA, the
BSA's "'public orientation and prominence in the community rightfully
place[d] it within the regulatory ambit of the [UCRA]."' 3 In reaching
its decision, the trial court relied on the inclusive nature of the BSA's
membership criteria, the BSA's active recruitment of new members, its
regular fund raising activities, its media publications, as well as its ownership of a large physical plant, maintenance of a summer camp facility,
and operation of a retail shop.3 6 In addition, the court noted that to hold
otherwise "would endorse a 'right' to discriminate on the part of an organization serving a unique position in our society."32 A finding that the
BSA is private and therefore able to discriminate on the basis of race,
ancestry, disability, etc. "would send a stark message about what the
'
ideals of this country really mean, a message that is not true." 21
The trial court then proceeded to the second phase of the trial to
determine if the inclusion of gays would violate the BSA's members'
right to intimate and/or expressive association. The BSA's argument regarding its members' right to intimate association was dismissed based
on its size, non-selective membership, public orientation, and wide

321. See id.
322. See id. For an examination of the Unruh Civil Rights Act ("UCRA"), see supraPart II.
323. See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 222, 224
(Cal. 1998). The BSA referred to the freedom of association argument as an affirmative defense.
See id. at 224.
324. See id. at 224-27.
325. Id. at 224.
326. See id. at 223-24.
327. Id. at 224.
328. Id.
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community presence.329 However, since the BSA's activities were
"overwhelmingly expressive" and the BSA illustrated the requisite
nexus between its expressive activities and its exclusionary policy, the
court held that the BSA's members' right to expressive association
would be violated.330 The Court accepted the BSA's contention that its
expressive ideals concerning sexual morality are addressed in the Scout
Oath and Law and that homosexuality directly conflicts with them.3 '
The Scout Oath and Law, combined with the limited yet consistent BSA
written statements, and the testimony from BSA leaders concerning its
anti-gay
policy, were enough evidence to prove the necessary connec332
tion.
Both parties appealed to the California Court of Appeals which, in
a divided decision, affirmed the judgment for the BSA.333 The appellate
court agreed that the BSA's right to expressive association would be
violated if it were required to include homosexuals; however, it overruled the remainder of the trial court's findings and held: (1) the BSA is
not a business establishment under the UCRA; and (2) the application of
the UCRA would violate the BSA's right to intimate association.334 The
dissenting opinion disagreed with the majority on all issues, concluding
that the BSA is a business establishment and the acceptance of gays
would not violate either associational right.3 The California Supreme
Court granted review and, relying solely on the conclusion that the BSA
is not a business establishment under the UCRA, affirmed the decision
of the court of appeals.336
The Curran majority opinion was devoted entirely to a discussion
of the UCRA. The court began by providing a summary of the statute's
legislative history. It explained the impetus behind the creation of the
public accommodation statute and discussed its many prior drafts.337 The
court discussed the four main California cases interpreting the UCRA,33'
and emphasized the court's consistent approach in interpreting the term
329. See id. at 225.
330. See id. at 225-27.
331. See id. at 225-26.
332. See id.
333. See id. at 227.
334. See id.
335. See id.
336. See id. at 227, 239.
337. See id. at 229-30.
338. See id. at 229-36 (discussing Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club, 896 P.2d 776
(Cal. 1995); Isbester v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 707 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1985); O'Connor v.
Village Green Owners Ass'n, 662 P.2d 427 (Cal. 1983); Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 370 P.2d 313

(Cal. 1962)).
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"'all business establishments of every kind ...in the broadest sense
reasonably possible."'339 The selectivity of the organization's membership policies, the allowance of nonmember participation for a fee, the
occurrence of business transactions, and the similarities between the organization and a public amusement are factors the court looked to in its
interpretation of the statute.'
Although the California courts have generally interpreted the
UCRA broadly, the Curran court was unwilling to extend the UCRA's
scope to include the BSA. The court concluded that the UCRA was not
intended to govern "charitable, expressive, and social organizations, like
the [BSA], whose formation and activities are unrelated to the promotion or advancement of the economic or business interests of its members."'4t The plaintiff's argument that the BSA's admission policies are
nonselective and open to the public was rejected by the court as insufficient to constitute a business establishment, public accommodation or
public amusement.4 The court further distinguished the BSA's business
dealings (through its retail shops and licensing of its insignia), as distinct from its primary functions and not indicative of a "commercial
purveyor of the primary incidents and benefits of membership in the organization."' 3 The trial court's concern that the BSA, as a private organization, will be free to discriminate on any basis, was also dismissed
by the Curran court on the grounds that victims of other types of discrimination may sue under other anti-discrimination statutes.3" The
Curran court concluded the majority opinion by putting the ball back in
the legislature's court. It stated that if the legislature wanted to extend
the scope of the UCRA so as to incorporate "charitable, expressive and
social organizations" like the BSA, it has the authority, subject to constitutional constraints, to do so." s
Since the Curran majority sustained the judgment for the BSA
based on statutory interpretation and application, it refrained from discussing the BSA's constitutional argument of freedom of association.

339. See id. at 236 (quoting Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 370 P.2d 313 (Cal. 1962)).
340. See id. at 234-37. "'[ln carrying on such activities for a fee, [a] club operates as the
functional equivalent of a commercial caterer or commercial recreational resort--classic forms of
"business establishments" ....' Id. at 234 (quoting Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club,
896 P.2d 776, 792 (Cal. 1995)).
341. Id. at 236.

342. See id. "[M]embership in the [BSA] is not simply a ticket of admission to a recreational
facility that is open to a large segment of the public .....
Id. at 236.
343. Id. at 238.
344. See id. at 238-39.
345. See id. at 239.
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Justice Kennard, however, believing ambiguous statutory terms should
be construed so as to avoid constitutional problems, addressed the constitutional issues in a concurring opinion where he concluded that application of the UCRA to the BSA would violate its members' First
Amendment rights.
Although there was no indication in the procedural history that the
BSA alleged a freedom of speech violation, Justice Kennard concurrently addressed the potential infringement of the BSA's constitutional
rights to both freedom of speech and freedom of association. He explained the basis and importance of both freedoms and briefly summarized the freedom of speech principles set forth in Hurley. 34 The Jaycees two part freedom of association test was not discussed in detail.
However, Justice Kennard stated that in each case where the United
States Supreme Court rejected a freedom of association challenge to the
application of a state's public accommodation law, the Court always
emphasized "that the law that withstood constitutional scrutiny either
'require[d] no change in the [organization's] creed' and 'impose[d] no
restrictions on the organization's ability to exclude individuals with
ideologies or philosophies different from those of its existing members." ' Justice Kennard, however, failed to mention the requisite
nexus between the organization's expressive activities and exclusionary
policy or the Supreme Court's freedom of association balancing test.
What Justice Kennard did devote a large portion of his concurrence
to was the Court's analysis in Hurley. He summarized the Supreme
Court's freedom of speech analysis and concluded that the Hurley
Court's brief discussion of freedom of association was "an alternative
basis for [the Court's] decision." 349 As such, Justice Kennard viewed
Hurley as "on point" and binding on the California court.350

346. See id. at 252-57 (Kennard, 3., concurring).
347. See id. at 253-54. "The right to freely express one's beliefs or ideas, unpopular as they
may be, is essential to 'nearly every other form of freedom."' Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937)). "'An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the
government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference by
the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also
guaranteed."' Id. (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984)).
348. Id. at 255 (quoting Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 627) (alterations in original). Justice Kennard
also stated that the public accommodation statutes that withstood the freedom of association challenge "erected no obstacle to 'a club seek[ing] to exclude individuals who do not share the views
that the club's members wish to promote' or did 'not require the clubs to abandon or alter' any
expressive activities." Id. (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
349. Id.
350. See id.
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Justice Kennard accepted the trial court's finding that the BSA was
primarily an expressive organization and ultimately concluded that had
the California court held that the BSA's membership policies were subject to the UCRA, the BSA would have had a "compelling argument"
that forcing it to accept homosexuals, or anyone else with views contrary to the BSA's "guiding precepts," would violate its members' First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. 51 Justice Kennard characterized the BSA's anti-gay policy as a "basic precept" and,
based on Curran's statement to Alexander that he wanted other kids to
understand that there was nothing wrong with homosexuality, viewed
Curran's interest in adult membership as a vehicle for the promotion of
views contrary to that precept. 5 2 Finally, in a footnote, Justice Kennard
stated that he was not persuaded by the New Jersey Superior Court's
holding in Dale.353 Justice Kennard believed the Dale court missed the
critical issue which he characterized as "[w]hether granting [Dale] the
relief he sought would violate the First Amendment right of the Boy
Scouts, by means of its policy and membership decisions, to choose the
content of the organization's own message."' However, Justice Kennard failed to note that this issue is based on freedom of speech and that
the BSA never alleged such a violation in Dale. Justice Kennard concluded his concurrence by comparing the BSA to the NAACP and the
B'nai B'rith. He stated:
Could the NAACP be compelled to accept as a member a Ku Klux
Klansman? Could B'nai B'rith be required to admit an anti-Semite? If
the First Amendment protects the membership decisions of these
groups, must it not afford3 the
55 same protection to the membership decisions of the Boy Scouts?
Justice Kennard obviously believed that it must.
C. Richardson v. Chicago Area Council of the
Boy Scouts of America
Keith Richardson had been involved in the Boy Scouts of America
from the time he was seven years old through age twenty-one. 36 He

351. See id. at 254.
352. See id.
at 253-54.
353. See id.
at 256 n.l.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 257.
356. See Richardson v. Chicago Area Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., No. 92-E-80, 1996
WL 734724, at *1, *3 (Chi.Comm'n Hum. Rel. Feb. 21, 1996), affd, No. 96 CH 03266, at 1 (Ill.
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achieved the rank of Eagle Scout in the minimum amount of time necessary, was an assistant patrol leader, a senior patrol leader, a junior assistant Scoutmaster, and a Vigil Honor member of the Order of the Arrow. Richardson attended the BSA's National Leadership seminars
and lectures and was a Scout Camp Commissioner in charge of four to
five counselors and adults. 358 In addition to his BSA membership, Richardson joined the BSA Explorer program where he was elected Regional Explorer Chairman, sat on the Explorer National Cabinet and was
Administration Chairperson of the National Explorer Conference. 359
Throughout his BSA tenure, Richardson was never made aware of the
BSA's position on homosexuality.3' 6 The morality or immorality of homosexuality, the importance of heterosexuality, and sexual orientation
361
in general were never directly discussed or indirectly conveyed
Richardson acknowledged his homosexuality and became comfortable with it in his early twenties.3 62 At this time Richardson sought employment in "risqu6 jobs," which included restaurants and bars that cater to the homosexual population. 363 In the spring of 1992, Richardson
decided to leave the "food and beverage" industry and seek employment
with the not-for-profit organization, Forgotten Scouts. 314 One of the Forgotten Scouts' purposes is to illustrate that the BSA's anti-gay policy is
"'wrong ...and should be changed.' 36 Pursuant to this goal, Richardson contacted the spokesperson for the Chicago Area Council of the
BSA ("CAC"), Susan Teplinsky, and asked if the BSA would hire a gay
man. 3 Teplinsky, in accordance with the BSA's employment
policy
367
concerning the hiring of homosexuals, responded "no way.
The BSA's current written employment policy was established in
1993 and states in pertinent part:
With respect to positions limited to professional Scouters or, because
of their close relationship to the mission of Scouting, positions limited
Cir. Ct. Cook County Aug. 12, 1999) (unpublished opinion) (on file with the Hofstra Law Re-

view).
357. See id.
358. See id.
359. See id. The Explorer program is a coeducational program for young people ages 14

through 20. See id.
360. See id. at *4.

361. See id.
362. See id.
363. See id.
364. See id.
at *4-*5.
365. Id. at *5 (quoting Tr. Apr. 5, 1995, at 278).

366. See id.
367. Id.
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to registered members of the [BSA], acceptance of the Declaration of
Religious Principle, the Scout Oath and the Scout Law is required.
Accordingly, in exercise of its constitutional right to bring the values
of Scouting to its youth members, [the BSA] will not employ atheists,
agnostics, known or avowed homosexuals or others as professional
Scouters or in other capacities in which such employment would tend
to interfere with its mission of reinforcing the values of the Scout Oath
and the Scout Law in young people.
The policy of the [BSA] is to comply with nondiscrimination laws to
the extent that may constitutionally be applied to it.' 68
In May, 1992, Richardson filed a complaint with the Chicago
Commission on Human Relations alleging that the BSA's employment
policies violated the Chicago Human Rights Ordinance ("CHRO")2. 69 To
eliminate a potential standing problem, Richardson sent a letter and his
resume to the CAC indicating that he was gay and interested in an employment position.370 The CAC responded by sending Richardson a copy
of the revised BSA employment policy regarding the hiring of publicly
avowed homosexuals.37' The litigation continued and the CAC asserted,
among other things, that the application of the CHRO violated its First
Amendment right to freedom of associational expression.372
An administrative hearing was held between April 5, 1995 and
April 21, 1995. 373 On February 21, 1996, the Commission issued its Final Ruling on Liability and Damages where it held that the CAC's employment policy discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation in violation of the CHRO, and since opposition to homosexuality is not an
expressive purpose of the CAC, its right to freedom of association
would not be infringed.374 Furthermore, any slight infringement on this
constitutional right is substantially outweighed by the government's
compelling interest in eradicating discrimination. 75

368. Id. at *9-*1O.
369. See id. at *1-*2.
370. See id. at *6.
371. See id.
372. See id. at *1. The Chicago Area Council ("CAC") also argued that it was exempt from
the Chicago Human Rights Ordinance ("CHRO") as a religious organization and that application
of the CHRO would violate its right to freedom of speech. See id.
373. See id. at *2.
374. See id. at *1.
375. See id. The Commission also held that the CAC is not exempt from the CHRO as a religious organization and that the CAC's right to freedom of speech is not violated. See id.
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The constitutional argument of freedom of association can be
raised in numerous contexts. While the more common scenario is the
application of a state public accommodation law, the issue may also be
raised in response to the application of an anti-discrimination employment law. Since Richardson sought and was denied employment, not
simply membership as in Dale and Curran,the BSA's constitutional defense was raised in the employment law setting.37
The Commission began its constitutional discussion by rejecting
Hurley as binding and declaring the principles set forth in Jaycees and
Rotary Club to be the applicable standards.3" The facts and holding of
Hurley were summarized and then distinguished from the instant case.
The Commission concluded that, unlike the selection of parade contingents, the selection of an employee "has little, if any, expressive quali'3 In addition, the "peculiar" application of Massaties inherent in it.'"1
chusetts' public accommodation law to the South Boston Parade was
distinguished from the traditional regulation of discriminatory employment policies"S Thus, the Commission concluded that while an organization may, pursuant to the right to freedom of association, exclude individuals with views contrary to its own beliefs, an organization's right
to expressive association is not absolute.38' The constitutional right will
only protect an organization's "expressive goals ...from unwarranted
governmental intrusion.' '3 2 As applied to the instant action, "[i]nherent
in the term 'expressive goal' . ..is the requirement that opposition to
homosexuality be embodied in some writing or oral statement which is
identified as a goal, philosophy, belief or value of Scouting and further
it must be expressed as one of Scouting's goals. 38 3
As in Curran and Dale, the CAC argued that, as evidenced by the
Scout Oath and Law and the terms "morally straight" and "clean," the

376. The Commission provides a detailed analysis of the CHRO's applicability to the BSA.
See id. at *23-*26. However, since the focus of this Note is primarily on freedom of association
and secondarily on public accommodation statutes, the CHRO portion of the administrative opinion will not be addressed. What will be discussed at length is the Commission's rationale for rejecting the CAC's argument that application of the CHRO will violate its right to freedom of expressive association. Since the CAC's right to intimate association was not addressed by the
Commission, the assumption may be drawn that the right was not asserted.
at *30.
377. See id.
378. See id. at *28-*30.

379. Id. at *30.
at *29-*30.
380. See id.
381. Seeid. at*29.
382. Id.
383. Id. at*30.
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exclusion of gays has always been an expressive purpose of the BSA."'
The Commission, unconvinced by this argument, found that the opposition to homosexuality is not an expressive goal of the CAC or BSA and
that the CAC's
anti-gay policy is nothing more than a discriminatory
38 5
hiring policy.
The Commission rejected the CAC's argument that the terms
"morally straight" and "clean" found in the Scout Oath and Law illustrate the expressive goal of opposition to homosexuality.386 The definitions of these terms, as provided in the BSA Handbook, do not contain
any reference to sexual orientation.3 While the CAC witnesses testified
that they interpreted the terms to refer to being heterosexual, the Commission, not challenging their sincerity, concluded that the BSA leaders'
"personal interpretations have no basis in Scouting doctrine. 3 88 The
CAC countered by asserting that "only Scouting can speak for Scouting." 38 9 However, the Commission also rejected this argument, stating
that "an organization with a defined body of doctrine cannot just choose
to interpret its goals differently from their stated meaning merely to
justify a discriminatory hiring policy."3 Moreover, the leaders of the
BSA can not attribute a discriminatory definition to the Scout Oath or
Law when it does not possess such a meaning." '
In addition to analyzing the CAC's interpretation of the Scout Oath
and Law, the Commission reviewed thousands of pages of BSA materials and noted that while the expressive beliefs and goals concerning patriotism, courage, and self reliance are contained throughout, nowhere in
the literature could the Commission find heterosexuality as a goal to be
instilled in BSA members.3' 9 The BSA's purported expressive goal of
opposing homosexuality was not included in its charter, bylaws, mission
statements, annual reports, or handbooks, and no witness testified that
as part of his Scouting experience he was taught the virtues of heterosexuality or the evils and immorality of homosexuality.3 9 In fact, the
Commission noted that the Scouting literature emphasized that discussions concerning sex should take place within the family because the
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.

See id. at *31.
See id. at *30-*32.
See id. at *30-*31.
See id. at *31.
Id.
Id. at *31 (quoting Resp't Reply Br. at 12).
Id. at *32.
See id. at *32.
See id. at *30.
See id. at *30-*31.
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subject of sex "is not construed to be Scouting's proper area, and
[because Scout leaders] are probably not well qualified to [discuss such
matters]." 3 The Commission rejected the revised 1993 written employment policy as a response to litigation and concluded that the only
written expressive goal of opposing homosexuals was the 1978 internal
memorandum that was not distributed throughout the BSA 9 5 This evidence alone was found to be insufficient to indicate that one of the
CAC's expressive goals was the opposition to homosexuality.
At the core of the CAC's argument is the notion that were it required to employ homosexuals, its ability to express its views would be
hindered.396 Finding that the CAC did not have the expressive goal of
opposing homosexuality, the Commission held that applying the CHRO
and mandating the employment of otherwise qualified homosexual individuals would not interfere with the CAC's expressive activities or
hinder its ability to express its views.39 The CAC could still require its
employees to communicate BSA policy as well as restrict the expression
of their contrary views.' 9' The CAC, however, argued that the mere
presence of a homosexual employee requires the abandonment of its
stated belief that homosexuality is immoral!3 " The Commission provided four grounds for rejecting this argument. First, it reiterated its
finding that the BSA's anti-gay policy is a discriminatory employment
policy and not an expressive goal.' Second, it stated that the government often requires an employer to abandon its discriminatory practices. " ' The very nature of anti-discrimination employment laws mandate changes in employer behavior. Third, it rejected the underlying
assumption that an employee's homosexuality will be evident and
known to all.4 Finally, the Commission employed the Supreme Court's
balancing test and concluded that even if the application of the CHRO
interferes slightly with the CAC's expressive activities, such interfer-

394. Id. at *31 (quoting Ex. R22 at 74).
395. The Commission did not discuss the 1991 or 1993 position statements, perhaps because
they dealt with homosexual members rather than homosexual employees.
396. See id. at *34.
397. See id. at *34-*37.

398. See id. at *34.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.

See id. at *35.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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ence is justified by the city's compelling interest in the elimination of

invidious discrimination.4
In reaching these conclusions, the Commission expressly rejected
the California Appellate Court's rationale in Curran.0 5 The Curran appellate court emphasized Curran's motives for seeking adult membership and the influence the Scoutmaster and assistant Scoutmaster have
on their Scouts.' It concluded that an avowed homosexual assistant
Scoutmaster would cause the Scouts to believe that homosexuality is
morally straight and would increase the likelihood that they would engage in such conduct.4 Aside from noting the falsity of this conclusion,4° the Commission distinguished the instant case by pointing out
that Scout Executives, unlike assistant Scoutmasters, are paid employees that have little direct contact with the Scouts. 4 9 Moreover, it was
noted that the Currancourt "concluded that it was Curran's conduct and
advocacy, rather than his status, that caused his exclusion." 4'0 In the in-

stant case, the rejection of Richardson's application for employment
was based solely on his sexual orientation.41 ' Since the CAC was unable

to avail itself of the constitutional defense of freedom of association, its
anti-gay employment decisions were found
by the Commission to be
41 2
discriminatory and illegal under the CHRO.

404. See id. at *35, *37-*40.
405. See id. at *35-*37.
406. See id. at *35; supra Part IV.B. Curran "'specifically wanted to [be in the Scouts]because he so firmly believed personally in a homosexual lifestyle that there was, quote, not anything wrong with it and he wanted to make sure that other kids understood that."' Curran v. Mount
Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 222 (Cal. 1998) (quoting Timothy Curran, the plaintiff in the case) (alteration in original).
407. See Richardson, 1996 WL 734724, at *36.
408. The Commission stated:
According to Dr. Bryant Welch,.... ["a Harvard educated clinical psychologist who has
been employed as senior policy advisor for the American Psychological Association
since 1986"].... the accepted research and literature in the scientific community accepts the fact that sexual orientation is most likely set early in life, prior to age six.
Id. at *14. In addition, "Dr. Welch testified that studies have shown that children raised by gay
parents are no more likely to identify as homosexual than those raised by heterosexual parents."
Id. "With regard to the fear that homosexual [men] will molest [young boys]," Dr. Welch testified
that "a study of predatory sexual behavior and pedophilia has shown that these types of behaviors
are overwhelmingly characteristic of men who are heterosexual and insecure in their own sexual
identities as heterosexual, rather than of men who are homosexual." Id.
409. See id. at *35.
410. Id.at*36.
411. See id.
412. See id. at*l-*2.
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V. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA
Over the years the BSA has been involved in continuous litigation
involving the exclusion of women and atheists. In almost every case the
BSA asserts its constitutional right to freedom of association and although the rationale varies, courts usually find for the BSA. The litigation regarding the BSA's anti-gay policy is changing this pattern. While
superficially the BSA's exclusion of homosexuals appears no different
than its exclusion of atheists or women, a difference does exist and it
lies within the judiciary-the courts are split as to whether the BSA's
constitutional right to intimate and/or expressive association allows
them to exclude homosexuals. This lack of uniformity will ultimately
lead to the steps of the United States Supreme Court. When it does, the
Court should apply the Jaycees freedom of association test and conclude
that the forced inclusion of homosexuals will not violate the BSA's
constitutional right to freedom of association.
To begin, Justice Kennard's conclusion that Hurley is binding on a
freedom of association analysis is simply incorrect. The holding in
Hurley was based on the violation of the Council's (the private parade
organizers) freedom of speech. 413 The brief discussion of freedom of association was unnecessary to the holding, rendering it conclusory dictum. The Court did not summarize the principles of the doctrine of freedom of association, nor did it discuss the factors of intimate association,
the requisite impingement of the group's expressive message, or the
balancing test. The Court all but conceded that the case was decided on
a freedom of speech analysis when it stated in its conclusion that its
"holding ...rests not on any particular view about the Council's mes44
1
sage but on the Nation's commitment to protect freedom of speech.''
Assuming Justice Kennard is correct and the one paragraph discussion of freedom of association was not dictum but rather an alternative basis for the Court's holding, Hurley can still be distinguished from
a case involving the BSA's anti-gay membership policy. While the
marching unit selection process in Hurley was afforded constitutional
protection on the basis that it was a symbolic exhibition of free speech,
the membership selection processes in Jaycees, Rotary Club, and New
York Club Ass'n were not afforded the same protection. In fact, the Jaycees Court explicitly rejected the Jaycees' argument that the admission
of women as full voting members would alter a symbolic message por413. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 581

(1995).
414. Id.
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trayed by the fact that women were not permitted to vote.r This inconsistency illustrates that Hurley focuses on freedom of speech and Jaycees, Rotary Club, and New York Club Ass'n focus on freedom of association. Since the BSA's membership selection process is at issue, the
test promulgated in Jaycees and clarified in Rotary Club and New York
Club Ass'n governs the BSA's freedom of association argument.
A. Freedom of Intimate Association and the
Boy Scouts of America
The right to intimate association presupposes deep attachments and
high selectivity. 416 While familial relationships exemplify the groups
that are usually protected by this right, the Supreme Court stated that the
right can protect other groups as well:47 The Court listed several factors
to be explored in an intimate association analysis, however it has focused on the factors of selectivity, purpose, and size. 4 s As such, these
factors will be applied to the BSA to determine if it is within the zone of
privacy. 9
The membership criteria for the Boy Scouts is not highly selective.
According to the Boy Scout Handbook, the selection of a Boy Scout
member is based on three prerequisites; a Scout must: (1) be a boy who
has completed the fifth grade, earned the Arrow of Light Award, or be
between the ages 11 and 17; (2) find a Scout troop near his home; and,
(3) complete the Boy Scout joining requirements which include understanding and agreeing to live by the Scout Oath, the Scout Law, the
Scout motto, the Scout slogan, and the Outdoor Code.420 Although not
415. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627 (1984).
416. See id. at619-20.
417. See Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537,545 (1987).
418. See New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 12 (1988); Rotary
Club, 481 U.S. at 545-47; Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 620-22.
419. See Jaycees,468 U.S. at 620-22.
420. See BIRKBY, supra note 1, at 2. The joining requirements include: submitting a Boy
Scout application and health history signed by a parent or guardian; repeating the Pledge of Allegiance; demonstrating the Scout salute, sign, and handclasp; tying the square knot; describing the
Scout badge; completing the exercises in the BSA pamphlet How to Protect Your Childrenfrom
Child Abuse: A Parent'sGuide with a parent; and participating in a Scoutmaster conference. See
id. at 4. The Scout motto is: "Be Prepared." The Scout slogan is: "Do A Good Turn Daily." Id. at
9. The Scout Outdoor Code provides:
"As anAmerican, I will do my best to Be clean in my outdoormanners,
Be careful with fire,
Be consideratein the outdoors, and
Be conservation-minded."
Id. at55.
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included as a joining requirement, all Boy Scouts must also declare a
belief in God.41 The prerequisites are not illustrative of a highly selective organization and, in actuality, the BSA almost never denies membership to a boy who meets the age requirement and rarely does it cast
out a boy who fails to live by the Boy Scout ideals.4 =
The selectivity of the BSA's adult membership criteria is less clear.
The BSA adult application vaguely states that "[t]he applicant must possess the moral, educational, and emotional qualities that the [BSA]
deems necessary to afford positive leadership to youth." Exactly how
these determinations are made is not explained. The only concrete requirements provided are age, U.S. citizenship, and subscription to the
Declaration of Religious Principle, Scout Oath/Promise and Law.4 4 Although there is no indication as to how readily the BSA accepts an adult
volunteer, the adult membership criteria, while not as lenient as the
youth membership criteria, is not overly selective. Thus, regardless of
whether or not a court accepts the BSA's argument that its adult membership criteria are restrictive and selective, the BSA as a whole is not a
highly selective organization simply because more rigorous membership
criteria are applied to a single component.
The BSA is not an exclusive group. Non-members may be invited
to participate in troop meetings, and purchases from the Boy Scout retail store, including the Boy Scout Handbook and Scoutmaster Handbook, can be made by anyone.42 6 The only exception is that of the Boy
Scout uniform, which can only be purchased by registered members.4 7
In addition, the BSA has described its challenge as a year round recruitment process to get as many qualified boys to try its "product."4 '
One commentator has suggested that the absence of exclusionary policies and rules is due to the lack of interest from nonmembers.2 9 While
this may be true, with the exception of the exclusivity as to who may
421. See Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1278 (7th Cir. 1993); Randall v. Orange County Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 261, 266 (Cal. 1998); Seabourn v. Coronado
Area Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 891 P.2d 385, 406 (Kan. 1995).
422. See Varela, supra note 2, at 939-40.
423. Boy Scouts of America Adult Registration Application, supranote 204.
424. See id.
425. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270, 282 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998),
affd, No. A-1951196-97, 1999 N.J. LEXIS 995, at *1 (Aug. 4, 1999).
426. See BIRKEY, supra note 1, at 3; Varela, supranote 2, at 942.
427. See BIRKBY, supranote 1, at 567.
428. See BoY Scours OF AmERCA, THE ScoUm AsTER HANDBOOK 90-191 (1997) "[As]
[o]ne BSA spokesman has explained 'I think of scouting as a product and we've got to get the
product into the hands of as many consumers as we can.'" Dale, 706 A.2d at 281.
429. See Varela, supra note 2, at 942.
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wear the Boy Scout uniform, the absence of exclusionary rules and the
acceptance of limited nonmember participation leads to the conclusion
that the BSA is not an exclusive private group.
The determination of whether the BSA's size warrants constitutional protection pursuant to the right to intimate association will de-

pend upon which level of the organization's hierarchy-the patrol, the
troop, the regional council or the national BSA-will be examined by
the Court4a The patrol is viewed as the way to get every boy involved
in troop activities,43 ' and while much activity occurs within a patrol,4 2
the weekly meetings and monthly hikes and campouts are organized and
conducted by the troop.4 31 In addition, advancement through the Boy
Scout ranks must be overseen and approved by the Scoutmaster not the

Patrol Leader.4 4 With regard to the regional council, it is primarily administrative; however, it offers training for adult Scout Leaders and organizes large events, such as camporees, for the numerous troops within

its jurisdiction.435 Yet regardless of how much activity occurs at the different levels, the national BSA maintains control of the various groups

in that the BSA's nationally established membership policies, established by the national BSA, are uniformly applied throughout the hierarchy. Since this fact is determinative, the focus should be on the national BSA's five million members, an amount far in excess of a small

430. The patrol is a group of three to eight Boy Scouts led by a Patrol Leader, a Boy Scout
elected by the members of the patrol. See BIRKBY, supra note 1, at 10-11. Each patrol has a name,
often an animal, its own flag, emblem and call-for example if the patrol's name is the Wolf Patrol, the Patrol's call is a howl. See id. at 10-11, 535-41. A troop is comprised of approximately
thirty to forty boys, is the combination of a number of patrols, and is headed by a Scoutmaster. See
itt at 11-12, 542-44; Varela, supra note 2, at 939. The area in which a troop is located is referred
to as a district. See BIRKBY, supra note 1, at 546. The regional council oversees many districts and
is run by a full time staff. See id. at 546.
431. The BSA explains this idea in the "Johnny Counts" section of the Scoutmaster Handbook:
A patrol is a small group-three to eight boys-and each boy counts. Each boy gets involved, even the shy boy and the lazy boy, because he has to. They need him. In a
troop of 30 or 40 Scouts-and no patrols-Johnny would be just another face in a long,
long line-a Johnny Who. But in a patrol, no matter how many boys in the troop,
Johnny's friends know who he is, and what he can do, and why they need him.
BOY ScouTs OF AMERICA, supra note 428, at 33-34.
432. With the Scoutmasters' approval and participation, patrols may enjoy day hikes and
other outdoor activities. On some occasions portions of troop meetings are set aside for individual
patrols to meet. Patrols may also meet in addition to the weekly troop meeting. See BIRKBY, su1pra
note 1, at 535-44.
433. See id. at 544.
434. See id. at 12.
435. See id. at 546.
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intimate group.43 6 If, however, the Court de-emphasizes this fact and examines the regional council, whose membership can well exceed one
thousand,43 7 or the troop, whose membership hovers around thirty
boys, 4 s the size factor will remain unsatisfied; the membership at both
levels exceeds that of the smallest Rotary Club which was not afforded
intimate association protection. It appears that the BSA will only be
able to satisfy the size variable by convincing the Court to examine the

patrol group, a group of approximately ten boys whose "home [is] in the
' However, satisfaction of one of the Court's many intimate astroop."439
sociation factors does not guarantee that the BSA will be afforded this

constitutional protection.
Although the right to intimate association is not limited to family
and marriage, the Court has been reluctant to apply the right to groups
that do not possess at least some familial-like characteristics. The BSA
has admitted that what draws young boys to its organization is the excitement of outdoor activities.40 While the organization tries to instill its
ideals and foster a family-like atmosphere, the dynamics of the organization are not familial in that they are not private and intimate. The relationships that form within the BSA are not "the most attenuated of
personal attachments"; 44' however, affording the BSA constitutional
protection under the right to intimate association would radically expand its scope and application.

436. See HistoricalHighlights-1990's, supra note 201.
437. See David A. Avila, Boy Scouts Seek Donations to Defray Litigation Costs, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 6, 1992, at B4 (estimating the number of scouts participating in the Orange County Boy
Scouts to be 90,000); Wilma Norton, More Kids Joining Boy Scouts' Ranks, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Oct. 1, 1997, at 20 ("In Pinellas and West Pasco, the area covered by the West Central
Florida Boy Scout Council, the number of Scouts now is approaching 11,000."); Ross Werland,
Scout Salute, CHi. TRm., Feb. 6, 1994, at 1 ("Whe number of boys in the Scouting program of the
Northeast Illinois Council, extending from Evanston to the Wisconsin border, has swelled over the
last 10 years to 15,200 ....); see also Stewart Ain, Plan to Merge Scouts Upsets Some Leaders,
N.Y. TmsS, Apr. 25, 1999, at 3 (explaining that the merger between the Nassau County Council,
whose membership is approximately 12,500, with the Suffolk County Council, whose membership
is nearly 21,000, has been proposed); Anne Driscoll, Noteworthy, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 25, 1998,
at 2 (noting that the Yankee Clipper Council, which represents communities in northeastern Massachusetts and southeastern New Hampshire, serves 9,500 young people).
438. See Varela, supra note 2, at 939.
439. BIRKBY, supra note 1, at 10.
440. See BoY ScouTs OF AMERICA, supra note 428, at 3, 69.
441. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984).
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B. Freedom of Expressive Association and the
Boy Scouts ofAmerica
An organization seeking constitutional immunity under the right to
expressive association must show that it is involved in some type of expressive activity, and that the forced inclusion of the excluded group
would alter the existing members' ability to express their views, pursue
their goals, or engage in their expressive activities.442 In short, does the
presence of the excluded individuals compromise the expressive purpose of the group? Yet even if an organization answers this question affirmatively, it may still fall within the regulatory ambit of a state public
accommodation law. Infringement of the organization's right to expressive association is justified if the law is the least restrictive means to effectuate the state's compelling interest in the elimination of discrimination. The BSA is an organization that has sought this constitutional
insulation from the forced inclusion of the "[t]hree Gs.""' 3 While the
BSA's right to expressive association is applicable and often successful
in the exclusion of girls and atheists, 444 the applicability flounders in the
context of the inclusion of homosexuals.
As a preliminary matter, there is no question that the BSA is involved in many expressive activities. From its inception in the early
1900's, the BSA has always strived to be more than a tutor for tying
knots and pitching tents, though these are important aspects as well.
Rather, the BSA has sought to teach and instill the ideals of courage,
patriotism, self-reliance, citizenship and trustworthiness, to name a few.
The teaching of the Scout Oath, Law, Motto and Slogan, as well as the
troop discussions of these positive traits, all constitute constitutionally
protected expressive activities.44
However, for a successful expressive association argument, the
BSA must show that including homosexuals undermines its expressive
purpose. In an effort to satisfy this burden, the BSA has pointed to the
terms "morally straight" and "clean" and has produced four documents
442. See supraPart III.
443. See Whitman, supranote 7, at 50.

444. See Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1278 (7th Cir. 1993); Randall v. Orange County Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 261, 266 (Cal. 1998); Yeaw v. Boy Scouts of
Am., 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 85, 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997), review granted and opinion superseded by 942
P.2d 415 (Cal. 1997), and review dismissed, cause remandedby 960 P.2d 509 (Cal. 1998); Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc. v. Comm'n on Human Rights and Opportunities, 528
A.2d 352, 360 (Conn. 1987); Seaboum v. Coronado Area Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 891 P.2d
385,406 (Kan. 1995).
445. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am.,706 A.2d 270, 287-88 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1998),
aftid, No. A-195/196-97, 1999 N.J. LEXIS 995, at *1 (Aug. 4, 1999).
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all stating that homosexuals are excluded from Scouting." 6 This evidence is unconvincing. Nowhere in the definitions of "morally straight"
or "clean" are there references to sexuality. In fact, the only mention of
sexuality is contained in the Boy Scout Handbook, which advises scouts
to be sexually responsible to women, children, their beliefs, and themselves." 7 Scouts are told to discuss sexual issues with their religious
leaders, parents, teachers, and Scoutmasters. 448 The addition of Scoutmasters to this list is a recent change to the original BSA policy which
was to defer conversations and questions regarding sex to the Scout's
parents and/or religious leaders. 449 Perhaps this change was made to
bolster the argument that since the BSA views homosexuality as immoral, a homosexual Scoutmaster or assistant Scoutmaster will be unable to fulfill his potential duties and relate to the sexual issues of the
young Scout. In any event, heterosexuality is not encouraged and homosexuality is not explicitly condemned.
The use of the 1978 internal memorandum, the 1983 written
memorandum, and the 1991 and 1993 position statements as evidence
that one of the BSA's fundamental expressive purposes is the immorality of homosexuality and the exclusion of gays is weak. The 1978
memorandum was distributed only to a select group of Boy Scout leaders and the 1983 written statement, as well as the position statements,
were drafted in the wake of the Curran and Dale litigations. However,
giving the BSA the benefit of the doubt and assuming the timing of the
statements were a coincidence, the complete absence of this policy from
1910 through 1978 creates some doubt as to its fundamental nature.
Comparatively, the emphasis on the importance of an all male organization and a belief in God are documented back to the incorporation of
the BSA. Hence, the argument that the inclusion of women and atheists
runs contrary to the views that initially brought at least some of the BSA
members together is valid. This premise can not be applied to the BSA's
exclusion of gays. The failure to disseminate this view throughout the
BSA hierarchy and amend the organization's charter, by-laws, rules and
regulations, handbooks, and even applications for membership to in-

446. See supranotes 225-35 and accompanying text.
447. See BIRKBY supra note 1, at 527-28.
448. See id. at 528.
449. See Richardson v. Chicago Area Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., No. 92-E-80, 1996
WL 734724, at *31 (Chi. Comm'n Hum. Rel. Feb. 21, 1996), aff'd, No. 96 CH 03266, at 1 (111.
Cir. Ct. Cook County Aug. 12, 1999) (unpublished opinion) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review). -
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clude the anti-gay policy simply undermines the BSA's argument that
the policy is a fundamental expressive purpose of the organization.
The three aims of the BSA, as described in the Scoutmaster Handbook, are: building character; fostering citizenship; and developing fitness.5 To accomplish these goals the BSA emphasizes the ideals in the
Scout Oath and Law as well as teaching outdoor survival skills. The
BSA maintains that the inclusion of homosexuals impinges upon its
ability to carry out these goals yet they provide no explanation as to
how. The BSA has not explained how a homosexual, former Eagle
Scout, assistant Scoutmaster is less competent than a heterosexual assistant Scoutmaster in teaching the importance of courage and self-reliance
or how to tie the square knot or use a compass. In short, the BSA has
not shown the requisite nexus between their exclusionary policy and
their expressive purposes. The organization simply states that homosexuality conflicts with the BSA's fundamental ideals and, pursuant to
its members' right to expressive association, it has the right to "exclude
individuals who do not share the views that [its] members wish to promote." 45" ' In response to this argument the Dale court noted the BSA's
inconsistent application of the expulsion of individuals with views contrary to those that its members wish to promote.# The BSA has not expelled sponsors or members who publicly criticize its anti-gay policy.
An example of the BSA's disparate treatment is the case of Steven
Cozza of Petaluma, California.
Steven Cozza is a 12 year old active Boy Scout who has recently
completed the requirements for Eagle Scout. 453 He has publicly declared
that the BSA's anti-gay policy is discriminatory and contrary to the
ideals of the Scout Law.4 He stated:
The Scout Law says a Scout should be kind. He should treat others as
he would want to be treated. I don't know anyone who wants to be
discriminated against the way the [BSA] discriminates against gays.
My dad and I were told we can't 455
even bring this issue up at our meeting with other Scouts in our troop.

450. See BoY ScouTs OFAMERICA, supranote 428, at 69.
451. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988).
452. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270, 290-91 (1998), aftd, No. A-195/196-97,
1999 N.J. LEXIS 995, at *1 (Aug. 4, 1999).
453. See E-mail Interview with Scott Cozza, Steven Cozza's father (Jan. 14, 1999) (on file
with the Hofstra Law Review).

454. See id.
455. Steven Cozza, Scouting ForAll (visited Jan. 14, 1999)
<http:lwww.youthresource.comlBSAlcozza.htrn>.
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Cozza and his father, an assistant Scoutmaster, have not been expelled from the BSA and yet the BSA maintain that its members view
homosexuality as immoral.456 Perhaps the more appropriate question is:
Do the five million members believe this, or is it the opinion of the BSA
leaders?
The final aspect of an expressive association analysis is found in
the Court's balancing test. Assuming that the BSA can prove the connection between its anti-gay policy and expressive purposes, it may still
be forced to comply with the public accommodation law and include
homosexuals. This, however, is entirely based on whether a court will
find the elimination of the BSA's exclusionary policy a compelling state
interest.
In Jaycees the Supreme Court noted two types of compelling state
interests. The first was ensuring equal access to the goods and services
provided by the Jaycees.457 Specifically, by virtue of the Jaycees' discriminatory policies, women were being denied access to the intangible
goods and services of leadership skills, employment promotions, and
business contacts.4 8 The second compelling state interest was eliminating and preventing the "stigmatizing injury" that results from exclusionary policies based on "archaic and overbroad assumptions about the
relative needs and capacities of the sexes., 459 The severity of the stigmatizing injury caused by exclusionary policies varies with the circumstances and is often subjective.
Given the nature of the BSA and the activities it conducts, it is unlikely that a court will find the denial of access to BSA services a compelling state interest. High school students maintain that membership in
the BSA, especially as an Eagle Scout, is viewed positively by college
admission boards,'4 0 and although "networking" may occur during large
BSA events such as the Jamborees, these goods and services are tenuous
and do not resemble those offered by the Jaycees and Rotary Clubs. As

456. See E-mail Interview with Scott Cozza, supra note 453 (on file with the Hofstra Law
Review).
457. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984).

458. See id. at 626.
459. Id. at 625.
460. Interview with Scott Goodman, eleventh grade high school student, in Searingtown,
N.Y. (Jan. 5, 1999) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review). The California trial court rejected this
argument and the California Supreme Court addressed it in Curran in a footnote. The California
Supreme Court stated that "from the evidence presented at trial the trial court found that participation in scouting does not enhance 'a Boy Scout's chances of getting into the college of his
choice."' Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 228 n.11

(1998).
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one commentator notes: "Even a bridge club in which little is related

other than tasteless jokes may occasionally spawn a business arrangement. Yet, as this example illustrates, it surely overstates the equal access interest to characterize it as compelling with respect to every organization." '
The more persuasive argument is that the BSA's anti-gay policies
create a stigmatizing injury to homosexuals. The BSA is excluding ho-

mosexuals based on the "archaic and overbroad assumption" that homosexuality is immoral.4 2 Although not mentioned explicitly, an additional
possible reason for the exclusion of gays is based on the even more

"archaic and overbroad assumption" that homosexual Scout leaders will
molest the Scouts. 463The BSA's exclusionary policy not only compromises the dignity and self-worth of homosexuals, it "reinforces the false
notion that it is unsafe to have homosexuals around young boys."' 4
Categorizing the elimination of these discriminatory beliefs as a compelling state interest depends on whether the courts view discrimination

against homosexuals as invidious and harmful as discrimination based
on race, gender, or religion. One commentator notes that "[t]he forced

integration of the BSA matters precisely because the integration of the
BSA is trivial." 456 Perhaps this was said when the first woman or the
first black man sought admission to an organization with exclusionary
policies. The integration of the BSA matters precisely because the
elimination of discrimination is important.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The constitutional right to freedom of association does not insulate
the BSA from state public accommodation laws. Though it maintains
that homosexuality conflicts with its expressive purposes and its mem-

461. Marshall, supranote 55, at 93.
462. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 625.
463. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270, 289 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998),
affd, No. A-195/196-97, 1999 NJ. LEXIS 995, at *1 (Aug. 4, 1999); Maitland Zane, Scout's
Honor, SAN FkANcisco CHRON., May 15, 1998, at 1 (noting that "[s]ome opponents of permitting
gay Scoutmasters have.., suggested that it might put Scouts at ... risk of being molested").
"[Scoutmaster Roger Brown's] reference to concerns about a camping trip points out the subtext in
this debate: the association of homosexuality with child molestation-or, at the least, the perception of an increased risk of it. Officially, the Boy Scouts' position is that homosexuality and sexual
molestation have nothing to do with each other... Unofficially, it's a link that came up repeatedly in interviews with scoutmasters, scouts and their parents." Tracy Thompson, Scouting and
New Terrain, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 1998, at 6.
464. Frank, supranote 2, at 36.
465. Varela, supra note 2, at 955.
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bers' expressive views, the real issue is the fear of child molestation. "
The BSA has not said this. Not only is it extremely politically incorrect,
but one can not exclude individuals for crimes they have not committed
or for events that may or may not occur. Nevertheless, this fear exists in
the minds of parents and acts as the impetus for the exclusionary policies.'67
No one is denying that the BSA is an organization that has many
positive attributes. It facilitates friendships, it attempts to instill the
ideals of courage, self-reliance, and citizenship, and above all, it teaches
boys how to pitch a tent and tie a sheepshank knot. Yet, it discriminates
against homosexuals. The BSA's anti-gay policy not only excludes an
entire class of individuals, it sends a mixed message to its members.
The Scout Law states a Scout is trustworthy, "[h]onesty is apartof
his code of conduct."4 s Except if the Scout is gay. Since the BSA only
excludes known and avowed homosexuals, so long as a gay Scout lies to
himself, his friends, and his family, he should be able to maintain his
BSA membership. The Scout Law also provides that a Scout is brave,
"[hie has the courage to standfor what he thinks is right even if others
laugh at him or threaten him." 9 Except if he's gay. If a gay Scout
musters up the courage to admit his homosexuality he is expelled from
the BSA. While this dichotomy may make sense to the BSA leaders up
high, it makes no sense to James Dale, Timothy Curran, Keith Richardson, Steven Cozza, and the rest of us down below.
POSTCRIPT
On August 4, and August 12, 1999, respectively, as this issue was
going to press, the Dale4 0 and Richardson' decisions were both affirmed. A unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the
BSA, as a public accommodation, violated the LAD by excluding James
Dale from membership.472 The Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois
held, in part, that the BSA's employment policy, which was to deny
466. See supra note 463.
467. See Peggy O'Crowley, Gay Leader Challenges the Scouts; State High Court Weighs
Exclusion, TIMES-PIcAYUNE, Feb. 7, 1999, at 17 (stating that some parents would remove their

sons from the BSA if they knew the scoutmaster was gay); Thompson, supra note 463, at 6.
468. BnunRY, supra note 1, at 553.
469. Id. at 558.
470. 706 A.2d 270 (NJ. Sup. Ct App. Div. 1998); see supraPart IV.A.
471. No. 92-E-80, 1996 WL 734724, at *1 (Chi. Comm'n Hum. Rel. Feb. 21, 1996); see supra Part IV.C.

472. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., No. 195/196-97, 1999 N.J. LEXIS 995, at *1, *75-*76
(Aug. 4, 1999).
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employment to known or avowed homosexuals, violated the CHRO."
In addition, and of primary concern for the purpose of this Note, both
courts found that the forced inclusion of homosexuals does not violate
the BSA's members' right to freedom of intimate and/or expressive association. Although both courts addressed the application of their respective state anti-discrimination laws to the BSA, in the interest of
brevity, I shall only discuss the courts' analysis of the BSA's purported
right to freedom of association.
Dale v. Boy Scouts of America
Revisited
The New Jersey Supreme Court's analysis of the BSA's constitutional argument began with an examination of the Supreme Court's
rules governing an organization's right to freedom of association. The
court summarized the Jaycees and Rotary Club holdings and found that
"'size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others are excluded from critical aspects of the relationship"' 47 4 were factors to be considered in determining whether "a protectable intimate association right [was] present." 475 Applying these factors, the court found that the BSA's large,
nonselective membership, inclusive purpose, and open invitation to
nonmembers to attend BSA meetings and functions, established that the
BSA is not "'sufficiently personal or private to warrant constitutional
protection' under the freedom of intimate association."47 6
Once again, the BSA maintained that the court should evaluate its
freedom of intimate association claim by examining the local troop
rather than the national organization. 4" The court explained that since
the size of a troop is greater than the smallest Rotary Club, neither level
grants a right of freedom of intimate association; however, because the
argument is stronger at the troop level, the court applied the remaining
intimate association factors to the local troop. 478 Nonetheless, the BSA's
argument was unsuccessful. The unselective nature of the BSA, specifically, the fact that the BSA has stated that "any boy" is welcome, the

473. See Richardson v. Chicago Area Council of the Boy Scouts of Am.,No. 96 CH 03266, at
1, 9-10 (Ill.
Cir. Ct. Cook County Aug. 12, 1999) (unpublished opinion) (on file with the Hofstra
Law Review).
474. Dale, 1999 N.J. LEXIS 995, at *85 (quoting Board of Dirs. v. Rotary Club of Duarte,
481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987)).
475. l
476. Id
477. See id at *85-*86.
478. See id. at*86.
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absence of an upper limit on the number of members, and the inclusive
purpose of the BSA which is to "ensure that its membership 'is representative of all of the population"' led the court to conclude that the
BSA may not maintain a viable intimate association argument.4
The court's expressive association argument was somewhat more
in depth. The requisite nexus between a group's exclusionary policy and
expressive activities was explained, and the Jaycees balancing test was
summarized. The court acknowledged that the BSA expresses a belief
in moral values, however, it remained unconvinced that a "shared goal
of [the BSA] is to associate in order to preserve the view that homosexuality is immoral."4'' Therefore, the court concluded that the application of the LAD does not violate the BSA's members' right to freedom of expressive association because it "does not have a significant
impact on [the] BSA members' ability to associate with one another in
pursuit of shared views."'
Unlike the Superior Court of New Jersey and the Chicago Commission on Human Relations, the New Jersey Supreme Court only examined the Scout Oath and Law in determining whether the BSA
"associates for the expressive purpose of advocating the immorality of
homosexuality. 48 3 The court dismissed the BSA's 1978 internal memorandum in a footnote "observ[ing] that the position paper was not disseminated to [BSA] members, and declin[ing], therefore, to view it as
representative of the members' shared views." The remaining position
statements and other written documents were criticized for being issued
after Dale's expulsion; "[t]he self-serving nature of these papers is apparent.' 415 With regard to the argument that the terms "morally straight"
and "clean" represent the BSA's view that homosexuality is immoral,
the court rejected that proposition stating the terms do not facially exon sexuality, much less the opinion that homosexuality
press any stance
86
is immoral.
An additional factor the court emphasized was the disparity between the BSA's litigation stance on homosexuality and the organization's inclusion of sponsors and members with opposing views.4
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.

litat *85-87.
See idat *88-*92.
Il at*93-*94.
Id at *92.
ld at *94 n.12.
l
Id.
See id at *95-*96.
See id. at *101-*03. The BSA has renewed the charters of sponsors whose positions on
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Moreover, the court found it difficult to reconcile the BSA's anti-gay
policy with its basic philosophy and goal of open membership. The
BSA's discriminatory exclusion of gays clearly contradicts its commitment to having a "diverse and representative membership," as well as
its objective which is to see "that all eligible youth have the opportunity
to affiliate with the [BSA]." 48 Concluding that the BSA's expulsion of
Dale was based on prejudice rather than a unified expressive position,
the court proceeded to apply the Jaycees balancing test.
Given the pervasiveness of bigotry and New Jersey's commitment
to protecting the victims of invidious discrimination, the court found
that the LAD serves a compelling state interest and that its application
"'abridges no more speech or associational freedom than is necessary to
accomplish that purpose." 9 Therefore, even if Dale's participation
impinges the BSA's expressive purpose, the "'infringement is justified
because it serves ...[New Jersey's] compelling interest in eliminating
discrimination' based on sexual orientation."' 9
The issue of whether Hurley is binding as a freedom of association
case or distinguishable as a freedom of speech case was not addressed
by the court. Although the Superior Court held that Hurley was inapplicable because it was a freedom of speech case, the Supreme Court discussed Hurley under a separate section entitled "Freedom of Speech. 49'
Nonetheless, after summarizing the facts and holding of the case, the
court found Hurley distinguishable on factual grounds.49 It held that the
position of a gay scout leader was not equivalent to a gay group marching under its own banner in a parade:4 In addition, unlike a parade
where the marchers are making some sort of collective point, Dale's
participation in the BSA was not to make a point on homosexuality. 4
Dale continues to seek admission because he respects and believes in
4 Unfortunately the sentiment is
the organization.ee
not shared; the BSA
plans to appeal the New Jersey decision to the Supreme Court of the

the morality of homosexuality differ from those of the BSA. See id. at *97 n.13.
488. Im at *101-*02.
489. Id at *109 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,629 (1984)).
490. Id.(quoting Board of Dirs. v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987))
(alterations in original).
491. Seeidat*110.
492. Seeid. at*112.
493. See id.
494. See id. at *113 (citing Hurley v.Irish-American Gay,Lesbian and Bisexual Group of

Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 568 (1995)).
495. See id
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discriminaUnited States with the hope that the Court will endorse its
right4 96
tory behavior and classify it as a valid constitutional
Richardson v. Chicago Area Council of the
Boy Scouts of America
Revisited
In affirming the Commission's holding, Judge Stephen Schiller
summarily rejected the BSA's constitutional argument. 497 At the beginning of his opinion, Judge Schiller noted that a trial court's standard of
review for administrative findings is limited. 498 Administrative conclusions of fact and law "must be accorded substantial weight and deference," however, when constitutional issues are implicated the trial judge
"must independently decide whether the record is sufficient to warrant a
decision's impact on those interests." 499 Consistent with this premise,
Judge Schiller deferred to two of the Commission's findings: (1) the
importance of heterosexuality is neither a goal of the CAC nor a message that the organization seeks to disseminate; and (2) the CAC's general lack of selectivity in its membership policies undermines the contention that the group is a "'distinctly private organization' entitled to
the claimed constitutional protection."5° Moreover, Judge Schiller noted
that the record supported the Commission's conclusion that the CAC
does not associate "to express themselves sexually or to discuss sex." ''
While the court concluded that the CAC's reliance on Hurley was
misplaced, the basis for distinguishing Hurley was not fully explained."°
Finally, Judge Schiller noted the recent Dale decision by the New Jersey
Supreme Court and concluded that "[tihe Commission's determination
in this respect is supported by the evidence in the record and consistent
with the Dale court's determination. 5 3
The CAC and national BSA expressed their disappointment in the
Circuit Court ruling and stated their intentions to appeal the decision9 4
496. See Boy Scouts to Appeal New Jersey Ruling Against Ban on Gays (visited Aug. 5, 1999)
<http:ilwww.cnn.comUSI9908/04/gay.boyscouts.02/>.
497. See Richardson v. Boy Scouts of Am., No. 96 CH 03266, at 1, 10 (I. Cir. Ct. Cook
County Aug. 12, 1999) (unpublished opinion) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review).

498. See id. at 2.
499. Id.
500. Id. at 6.
501. Id at 5.
502. See id. The issue of whether Hurley governs freedom of speech cases or freedom of association cases was not addressed.

503. Id. at 6
504. See Frank J. Murray, Court Again Rules Against Scouts on Gays, WASH. TIMEs, Aug.
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Instead of expending time and energy in the preparation of an appellate
brief, the BSA ought to consider what the courts are saying about its
policies. "The courts' collective message to the [BSA] is powerful, clear
and unmistakable[:]" the BSA's discriminatory exclusion of homosexuals will no longer be tolerated.055
MarissaL. Goodman*

14, 1999, at Al.
505. liL (quoting Roger Leishman, an ACLU attorney).
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